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JURISDICTIONAL STATEMENT
Jurisdiction in this matter is conferred by Article I,
Section 12, Utah Constitution, Section 77-1-6 and 77-35-26,
U.C.A. (1953 as amended) and Rule 3, Rules of the Utah Court of
Appeals.
NATURE OF THE PROCEEDINGS
This is an appeal from a criminal conviction of violations of Section 76-8-508, Tampering With a Witness, a third
degree felony, and 76-8-201, Official Misconduct, a Class B
misdemeanor, which was entered in the Third District Court
following jury trial before the Honorable Raymond S. Uno.

The

third degree felony was reduced to a class A misdemeanor at the
time of sentencing.
STATEMENT OF THE ISSUES
1.

Whether the trial court erred in failing to grant

various pre-trial motions with respect to discoverv.
2.

Whether the grand jury testimony of Tolman should

have been suppressed as substantive evidence.
3.

Whether the trial court erred in ruling upon

admissibility of evidence.
4.

Whether the jury verdict was unduly influenced by

prosecutor misconduct or outside sources.
5.
conviction.

Whether the evidence was sufficient to sustain a

DETERMINATIVE AUTHORITIES
Section 76-8-508, Tampering with witness - Retaliation against
witness or informant - Bribery.
A person is guilty of a felony of the third
degree if:
(1) Believing that an official proceeding or
investigation is pending or about to be
instituted, he attempts to induce or otherwise cause a person to:
(a)

Testify or inform falsely; or

(b) Withhold any testimony, information,
document, or thing; or
(c) Elude legal process summoning him to
provide evidence; or
(d) Absent himself from any proceeding or
investigation to which he has been summoned;
or
(2) He commits any unlawful act in retaliation for anything done by another in his
capacity as a witness or informant; or
(3) He solicits, accepts or agrees to accept
any benefit in consideration of his doing any
of the things specified in paragraph (1).
Section 76-8-201, Official misconduct - Unauthorized acts or
failure of duty,
A public servant is guilty of a class B
misdemeanor if, with an intent to benefit
himself or another or to harm another, he
knowingly commits an unauthorized act which
purports to be an act of his office, or
knowingly refrains from performing a duty
imposed on him by law or clearly inherent in
the nature of his office.
Rule 104, Utah Rules of Evidence, Preliminary Questions.
(a)

Questions of admissibility generally.

Preliminary questions concerning the qualification of a person to be a witness, the
-2-

existence of a privilege, or the admissibility of evidence shall be determined by the
court, subject to the provisions of subdivision (b). In making its determination it is
not bound by the rules of evidence except
those with respect to privileges.
(b)

Relevancy conditioned on fact.

When the relevancy of evidence depends upon
the fulfillment of a condition of fact, the
court shall admit it upon, or subject to, the
introduction of evidence sufficient to
support a finding of the fulfillment of the
condition,
(c)

Hearing of jury.

Hearings on the admissibility of confessions
shall in all cases be conducted out of the
hearing of the jury. Hearings on other
preliminary matters shall be so conducted
when the interests of justice require or,
when an accused is a witness, if he so
requests.
(d)

Testimony by accused.

The accused does not, by testifying upon a
preliminary matter, subject himself to
cross-examination as to other issues in the
case.
(e) Weight and credibility.
This rule does not limit the right of a party
to introduce before the jury evidence relevant to weight or credibility.
Rule 606(b), Utah Rules of Evidence.
Upon an inquiry into the validity of a
verdict or indictment, a juror may not
testify as to any matter or statement
occurring during the course of the jury's
deliberations or to the effect of anything
upon his or any other juror's mind or
emotions as influencing him to assent to or
dissent from the verdict or indictment or
concerning his mental processes in connection
therewith, except that a juror may testify on
-3-

the question whether extraneous prejudicial
information was improperly brought to the
jury's attention or whether any outside
influence was improperly brought to bear upon
any juror. Nor may his affidavit or evidence
of any statement by him concerning a matter
about which he would be precluded from
testifying be received for these purposes.
Rule 801, Utah Rules of Evidence, Definitions.
(a)

Statement.

A "statement" is (1) an oral or written
assertion or (2) nonverbal conduct of a
person, if it is intended by him as an
assertion.
(b) Declarant.
A "declarant" is a person who makes a statement.
(c)

Hearsay.

"Hearsay" is a statement, other than one made
by the declarant while testifying at the
trial or hearing, offered in evidence to
prove the truth of the matter asserted.
(d)

Statements which are not hearsay.

A statement is not hearsay if
(1) Prior statement by witness. The
declarant testifies at the trial or hearing
and is subject to cross-examination concerning the statement and the statement is (A)
inconsistent with his testimony or the
witness denies having made the statement or
has forgotten, or (B) consistent with his
testimony and is offered to rebut an express
or implied charge against him of recent
fabrication or improper influence or motive,
or (C) one of identification of a person made
after perceiving him; or
(2) Admission by party-opponent.
statement is offered against a party
(A) his own statement, in either his
vidual or a representative capacity,
-4-

The
and is
indior (B) a

statement of which he has manifested his
adoption or belief in its truth, or (C) a
statement by a person authorized by him to
make a statement concerning the subject, or
(D) a statement by his agent or servant
concerning a matter within the scope of his
agency or employment, made during the
existence of the relationship, or (E) a
statement by a co-conspirator of a party
during the course and in the furtherance of
the conspiracy.
Rule 4(e), Utah Rules of Criminal Procedure.
When facts not set out in an information or
indictment are required to inform a defendant
of the nature and cause of the offense
charged, so as to enable him to prepare his
defense, the defendant may file a written
motion for a bill of particulars. The motion
shall be filed at arraignment or within ten
days thereafter, or at such later time as the
court may permit. The court may, on its own
motion, direct the filing of a bill of
particulars. A bill of particulars may be
amended or supplemented at any time subject
to such conditions as justice may require.
The request for and contents of a bill of
particulars shall be limited to a statement
of factual information needed to set forth
the essential elements of the particular
offense charged.
Rule 7(c), Utah Rules of Criminal Procedure.
If a defendant is charged with a felony, he
shall not be called on to plead befoire the
committing magistrate. During the initial
appearance before the magistrate, the defendant shall be advised of his right to a
preliminary examination. If the defendant
waives his right to a preliminary examination, and the prosecuting attorney
consents, the magistrate shall forthwith
order the defendant bound over to answer in
the district court. If the defendant does
not waive a preliminary examination, the
magistrate shall schedule the preliminary
examination. Such examination shall be held
within a reasonable time, but in any event

-5-

not later than ten days if the defendant is
in custody for the offense charged and not
later than 30 days if he is not in custody;
provided, however, that these time periods
may be extended by the magistrate for good
cause shown. A preliminary examination shall
not be held if the defendant is indicted.
Rule 19(c), Utah Rules of Criminal Procedure.
No party may assign as error any portion of
the charge or omission therefrom unless he
objects thereto before the jury is instructed, stating distinctly the matter to which he
objects and the ground of his objection.
Notwithstanding a party's failure to object,
error may be assigned to instructions in
order to avoid a manifest injustice.
Rule 23, Utah Rules of Criminal Procedure - Arrest of judgment.
At any time prior to the imposition of
sentence, the court upon its own initiative
may, or upon motion of a defendant shall,
arrest judgment if the facts proved or
admitted do not constitute a public offense,
or the defendant is mentally ill, or there is
other good cause for the arrest of judgment.
Upon arresting judgment the court may, unless
a judgment of acquittal of the offense
charged is entered or jeopardy has attached,
order a commitment until the defendant is
charged anew or retried, or may enter any
other order as may be just and proper under
the circumstances.
Rule 24, Utah Rules of Criminal Procedure - Motion for new trial,
(a) The court may, upon motion of a party or
upon its own initiative, grant a new trial in
the interest of justice if there is any error
or impropriety which had a substantial
adverse effect upon the rights of a party.
(b) A motion for a new trial shall be made
in writing and upon notice. The motion shall
be accompanied by affidavits or evidence of
the essential facts in support of the motion.
If additional time is required to procure
affidavits or evidence the court may postpone

-6-

the hearing on the motion for such time as it
deems reasonable.
(c) A motion for a new trial shall be made
within 10 days after imposition of sentence,
or within such further time as the court may
fix during the ten day period.
(d) If a new trial is granted, the party
shall be in the same position as if no trial
had been held and the former verdict shall
not be used or mentioned either in evidence
or in argument.
Article I, Section 12, Utah Constitution, [Rights of accused
person. ] .
In criminal prosecutions the accused shall
have the right to appear and defend in person
and by counsel, to demand the nature and
cause of the accusation against him, to have
a copy thereof, to testify in his own behalf,
to be confronted by the witnesses against
him, to have compulsory process to compel the
attendance of witnesses in his own behalf, to
have a speedy public trial by an impartial
jury of the county or district in which the
offense is alleged to have been committed,
and the right to appeal in all cases. In no
instance shall any accused person, before
final judgment, be compelled to advance money
or fees to secure the rights herein guaranteed. The accused shall not be compelled to
give evidence against himself; a wife shall
not be compelled to testify against her
husband, nor a husband against his wife, nor
shall any person be twice put in jeopardy for
the same offense.
Article I, Section 13, Utah Constitution, [Prosecution by information or indictment - Grand jury.1.
Offenses heretofore required to be prosecuted
by indictment, shall be prosecuted by information after examination and commitment by a
magistrate, unless the examination be waived
by the accused with the consent of the State,
or by indictment, with or without such
examination and commitment. The formation of
the grand jury and the powers and duties
thereof shall be as prescribed by the Legislature.
-7-

STATEMENT OF THE CASE
Tolman agrees in substance with the Statement of the
Case submitted by Harman and adopts its contents.

He also

provides the following supplement to procedural aspects of the
case.
Tolman was indicted on October 9.

(R. 2-10.) He made

oral motion to quash Count I on October 24, which was reserved by
Presiding Judge Daniels.

Tolman's arraignment was set over to

November 7, for hearing on a motion for preliminary examination.
(R. 12.)

The motion for preliminary hearing was denied on

November 7.

(R. 55, 57-58.)

Subsequent motions for Discovery,

Bill of Particulars and Motion to Quash Count I were filed, as
well as a Motion to Establish Preliminary Question In Re Conspiracy.

(R. 59-69.)

motions.

Memoranda were also filed supporting these

(R. 82-99.)

All these motions were ultimately and

summarily denied by the court.

(R. 159,160.)

However, no

pre-trial hearing or order was ever entered regarding the preliminary question of conspiracy.
Meanwhile, Harman had filed a Motion to Compel Discovery which was heard on January 23, which counsel for Tolman
attended and joined.

(R. 102.)

The court subsequently ordered

transcripts of all grand jury testimony pertaining to the Indictment.

(R. 118-119.)
Following the production of grand jury transcripts

ordered by the court (R. 118-119), Tolman determined that his

-8-

appearance before the grand jury diverged in form and substance
from other subject witnesses.

He filed a Motion to Quash or

Alternatively Suppress Statements (R. 186-187) along with supporting pleadings (R. 168-177), contending that he was improperly
advised as to his "subject" status which had adversely affected
his rights under the Fifth and Sixth Amendment of the United
States Constitution.

[These same pleadings also appear within

the record at R. 188-205, along with a copy of State v. Ruggeri
upon which Tolman supports his contention.]

The motion was not

heard until after commencement of trial.
When the motion was heard, Lorin Brooks testified in
supplement to the notes which had been attached as an exhibit to
Plaintifffs Responsive Pleading.
1020-1028.)

(R. 238-240; R. 537, T.

Counsel argued the motion and the court denied it.

(R. 537, T. 1037.)

Portions of Tolman's grand jury testimony

were read and copies of the transcript marked as Exhibits 30, 31
and 32.

(R. 530, T. 33-56.)
During the trial, the court was called upon to make an

evidentiary ruling regarding the testimony of witness Christensen
relating to conversations he had had with Tolman in August, 1983.
(R. 531, T. 1195-1208.)

A series of objections by the prose-

cution prompted the court to rule that Christensen could not
testify as to what he (Christensen) had stated during those
conversations.

Hence, several of Christensen's relevant state-

ments and perceptions were never allowed to be presented.

-9-

Voluminous testimony was presented at trial that Tolman
directed Dean Larsen to hide from Don Harman the fact that Larsen
had a copy of Tolman's unapproved seven-page report (see footnote
JW, infra).

When the jury instructions were prepared for sub-

mission, Tolman provided the court with his proposed instruction
on Count IV.

(R. 447,)

This instruction was rejected, and

Tolman objected that the instruction given created "strict
liability" and therefore was overly broad.

(R. 532, T. 1428.)

The court allowed the prosecutor's instruction to be given, and
Tolman was ultimately convicted of Count IV.
SUMMARY OF THE ARGUMENTS
SECTION I - PRE-TRIAL ISSUES
Tolman was denied adequate pre-trial discovery, despite
several explicit requests, upon which to prepare his defense
which ultimately created prejudice to him at trial.

This preju-

dice was exacerbated by the court's failure to determine the
preliminary question of conspiracy and Rule 104(a), U.R.E.
regarding the admissibility of Defendants' statements under Rule
801(d)(2)(E), U.R.E.

Despite Tolman's clear demonstration to the

court of the unique nature of this proceeding, the court failed
to adequately safeguard Tolman's interest in a fair trial.
SECTION II - TRIAL ISSUES
The trial court erred in allowing transcripts of
Tolman's grand jury testimony to be read into the record and
presented as Exhibits.

The court also failed to rule properly
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that a witness (Mike Christensen) could testify as to what he
said and did during conversations with Tolman which occurred in
August, 1983.
Section 76-8-508(1)(b) is unconstitutionally vague and
overly broad, and the trial court erred in failing to give
instructions requested by Tolman.
SECTION III - PROSECUTOR MISCONDUCT
The misconduct of the prosecution denied Appellant
Tolman the full panoply of rights, privileges and the due process
of law beginning with him being the sole grand jury witness
denied adequate notice of charges and access to counsel and
continuing through the concealment from him of exculpatory
evidence and attempts and preventing his presentment of probative
evidence and culminating in the open court statements that
Appellant could be called to testify on his own behalf.

The

court failed to sanction the prosecutorial misconduct by ordering
a mistrial or dismissal.
SECTION IV - POST TRIAL ISSUES
The jury verdict was the product of improper outside
influence and other improper consideration extraneous to the
evidence which, after many hours of deliberation, changed the
jury vote from 6-2 in favor of acquittal to an opposite result.
The said jury submitted the ultimate issue to one juror who
asserted his religious authority (Mormon priesthood) to seek
divine intervention by prayer after which he expressed the
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inspired or revealed knowledge from God of Appellant's guilt
which caused the four other jurors to change their opinion at
once and the remaining two to acquiesce to the inspired majority
due to implied intimidation and an erroneous belief that they
could not hang.
The court not only erred by denying Appellant's motions
for arrest of judgment/mistrial regarding these issues, the court
compounded the error by allowing a dictionary in the jury room
and by refusing to consider juror testimony on the question of
outside influence.

SECTION V - SUFFICIENCY OF EVIDENCE
There is insufficient evidence of Tampering with a
Witness and Official Misconduct to sustain a conviction of
Tolman.
ARGUMENT
SECTION I - PRE-TRIAL ISSUES
A. THE TRIAL COURT ERRED BY FAILING TO QUASH
COUNT I OF THE INDICTMENT WHICH CLEARLY DID NOT
SUFFICIENTLY CHARGE THE CRIME OF CRIMINAL CONSPIRACY
Tolman submitted to the court a Memorandum which
delineated the factual deficiencies of the Indictment regarding
Count I, the crime of Criminal Conspiracy in violation of
§76-4-201, Utah Code Annotated (as amended.)
A-l.)

(R. 82-88, Addendum

The arguments contained therein are part of the record,

and are summaried by stating that regardless of how that charge
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is read in relationship to Tolman, there is never any basis to
believe a unity of design, purpose, or will to establish an
agreement with Harman.

Secondly, none of the overt acts alleged

could possibly have been in furtherance of any presumed agreement, simply because they are not done in furtherance of the
crime'

of Tampering with Evidence, §76-8-501, Utah Code Annotat-

ed, (as amended).
The paucity of Utah case

law on grand jury proceedings

buttresses the general notion that this case had a sufficiently
unique nature to warrant meticulous treatment bv the trial court.
This issue presents merely one instance where the trial court
refused to acknowledge a procedural defect which may (and did)
prejudice the Defendant.
The case of State v. Strand, 674 P.2d 109 (1983) seems
to indicate that while the appropriate remedy for facially
defective charging document is amendment,/2 the Defendant is
entitled to fair notice of the charges he will be required to
meet.

Citing federal law under United States v. Goldstein, 386

F. Supp. 833 (D. Delaware 1973), the court makes it clear that
notice and fair opportunity to defend are the crux of the Sixth
Amendment.

As this court shall see, the fair opportunity to

defend in this case was denied from the outset, with undue
liberties afforded the prosecution in presenting otherwise
inadmissible and prejudicial hearsay under the guise of evidence
of conspiracy.
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B. THE PRESIDING JUDGE ERRED IN FAILING TO
GRANT A PRELIMINARY HEARING OR TO RESERVE
THE RIGHT TO RENEW BEFORE THE TRIAL JUDGE
Again, Tolmanfs position on this issue is extensively
argued in his Memorandum to the court.

(R. 16-26, Addendum A-2.)

The primary contention of Tolman is that Article I, Section 13 of
the Utah Constitution allows for such examination to occur, but
that the legislature has improperly contravened that privilege by
its enactment of Rule 7(c), Utah Rules of Criminal Procedure.
Clearly the Utah Constitution controls where subsequent
legislative enactment contravenes any provision therein.
Rampton, 556 P.2d 205 (1976).

Dean v.

Therefore, when Article I, Section

13 states that offenses shall be prosecuted "by indictment, with
or without such [preliminary] examination", it is not the province of the legislature to proscribe absolutely the availability
of such examination.

Plainly put, if the drafters of the Utah

Constitution had intended such a course, they would have omitted
the "with or" phrase for that section.
The right to preliminary hearing is substantial and
time-honored.

State v. Pay, 45 U. 411, 146 P.300 (1915).

In

this case, Tolman chose to exercise that right under the Utah
Constitution Declaration of Rights (Article I). Legislative
enactment contravening that right should not bar its exercise,
and the court erred in failing to grant Tolman1s motion. /3
C.

THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN FAILING
TO ORDER A BILL OF PARTICULARS

Tolman filed a Motion and Memorandum for a Bill of
Particulars under Rule 4(e), Utah Rules of Criminal Procedure for
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further information so as to be adequately informed of the nature
and cause of the accusation against him.
Addendum A-3.)

(R. 64-67, 89-90;

Within such filing were specific requests for

information not contained in the Indictment which became critical
at trial, and without the benefit of which Tolman was convicted
of Counts IV and V.

The court denied the motion.

(R. 275-276.)

By failing to grant Tolman's request, the trial court
denied him information sufficient to enable him to prepare his
defense.

State v. Jameson, 103 U. 129, 134 P.2d 173 (1943);

State v. Strand, (on remand) 720 P.2d 425 (1986).
This issue is analagous to that found in State v.
Solomon, 93 U. 70, 71 P.2d 104 (1937).
/4
statutory law,

In that case, pursuant to

defendant demanded a bill of particulars.

The

court ruled, on the basis of the statutory language, that the
bill of particulars was a right which defendant could demand.
In the instant case, Rule 4(e), Utah Rules of Criminal
Procedure, leaves a discretion with the court as to whether to
direct on its own motion the filing of a bill of particulars.
Rule 4(e) goes on now to state that the "request for and contents
of a bill of particulars shall be limited to a statement of
factual information needed to set forth the essential elements. .
."

It should have been apparent to the trial court that the

instant case clearly dictated that further factual information
was necessary in order for each defendant to prepare his defense,
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short of an actual presentation of evidence to be used.

See

State v. Mitchell, 571 P.2d 1351 (1977).
As stated by Appellant Harman in his appeal brief, by
failing to grant a bill of particulars the trial court wrongly
failed to limit or circumscribe the area, field or transaction as
to which the special prosecutors were allowed to offer "evi/5
dence".

This resulted in erroneous introduction of a

hodge-podge of otherwise irrelevant and subjectively formulated
conclusions.

See State v. Spencer, 101 U. 274, 117 P.2d 455

(1941), reh. denied 101 U. 287, 121 P.2d 912 (1942), overruled on
other grounds, 4 U.2d 404, 295 P.2d 345 (1956).

The product at

trial was actual prejudice to Tolman and was plain error in light
of the trial court's failure to grant other discovery requests.
D. THE COURT FAILED TO ESTABLISH THE PRELIMINARY
QUESTION OF CONSPIRACY, AND THEREFORE ERRED IN ALLOWING
THE ADMISSION OF CO-CONSPIRATOR HEARSAY THROUGHOUT TRIAL
Tolman joins in co-appellant Harman's argument that the
court failed to properly rule on the issue of the existence of
any conspiracy.

This failure resulted in improper admission of

voluminous statements ostensibly labeled "co-conspirator statements" under Rule 801(d)(2)(E), Utah Rules of Evidence.

As a

matter of course, Tolman likewise recites his reliance on the
ruling contained in State v. Gray, 717 P.2d 1313 (1986) and the
advisory nature of United States v. Austin, 786 F.2d 986 (10th
Cir. 1986) vis a vis the interpretation of the Federal Rules of
Evidence.

-16-

It should be further noted that Austin, in relying upon
the seminal language of United States v. Petersen, 611 F.2d
(10th Cir. 1 9 7 9 ) , strongly recommends the substantial
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independent

evidence required to show conspiracy be established at a
pre-trial proceeding rather than during the government's case in
chief.

Austin, 786 F.2d at 989-990.

Even the prosecution had

acquiesced that a threshold determination of the conspiracy was
required before trial.

(R. 538, T. 23.)

Once again, in a most

critical fashion, the case at bar diverges from the usual procedural course.

This, coupled with the courts equivocal

finding,

/6

served to create irreparable prejudice to each defendant on the
substantive criminal charges.
In summation, the effects of the failure of the court
to insure adequate pre-trial discovery are quite clear.

Grand

jury testimony, unilaterally obtained through leading questions,
was submitted on the theory of some non-existent conspiracy.

It

is safe to say that most or all of this improper evidence would
not have made it to trial if either a preliminary hearing, bill
of particulars, or proper 104 motion hearing had been ordered.
To that extent, Tolman was profoundly prejudiced before the trial
ever commenced.
SECTION II - TRIAL ISSUES
A.

THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN FAILING TO SUPPRESS
THE USE OF TOLMAN 1 S GRAND JURY TESTIMONY
Tolman believes the error here is plain, and relies

again on the pleadings submitted at trial.

-17-

(R. 188-191, 200-205;

Addendum A-4.)

It is clear from those pleadings and Plaintiff's

responses that the parties had divergent views as to what happened around 6:52 p.m. on April 9, 1986. What is revealing, and
frankly most supportive of Tolmanfs claim, is the instances where
those accounts coincide.
Witness Brooks1 notes indicate that upon being informed
of his subject status, Tolman "was prepared to testify as a
witness not knowing he was being looked at as a subject".
238.)

(R.

Brooks' notes do not reflect, but his testimony recalled,

that as soon as Tolman was informed of his subject status, he
stated "color me gone".

(R. 537, T. 1027.)

Brooks testified

that Tolman was not given a complete Miranda warning outside the
grand jury room.

(R. 537, T. 1026.)

Nor do his notes reflect

that at any time was Tolman informed outside the grand jury room
of the specific nature of the charges which were being considered
against Tolman.

(R. 238-240.)

Upon entry to the grand jury, Tolman was sworn and then
told he could have counsel present, but that meant outside th (
jury room.

(R. 243, 1. 15-19.)

When asked if he had a chance to

talk to his attorney, Tolman indicated "yes and no", since he had
spoken to his attorney earlier in the day, prior to being informed of his "subject" status.

(R. 244, 1. 18-23.)

Finally,

the nature of the investigation and the possibility of charges of
tampering with evidence were mentioned, but never was it clearly
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stated that Tolman was the "subject" of any specific criminal
charges.

(R. 245, 1. 2-15.)
The crux of this argument is that a "subject" witness

before the grand jury is an "accused" and he must be advised of
all of his rights in light of the potential charges against him.
State v. Ruggeri, 429 P.2d 969 (1967).

The court makes two

observations therein which absolutely pertain to the instant
case.
The first, in reciting findings from People v.
Tomasello, 48 Misc. 2d 156, 264 N.Y.S.2d 686, is "[i ] f a possible
defendant or target of an investigation is subpoenaed before a
grand jury and there testifies, whether or not he claims or
asserts his privilege against self incrimination, his constitutional privilege is deemed violated."

I_d. at 690.

This state-

ment indicates that the violation commences upon the issuance of
a subpoena to appear without prior acknowledgement of "subject"
status.

The fact that Tolman was informed, however inadequately,

of that status just prior to his scheduled appearance does not
cure the defect.

Nor is it clear from the testimony and notes of

Lorin Brooks that his choice to remain was voluntary.

"Color me

gone" evidences, however colloquially, a desire to vacate the
premises.

Likewise, the special prosecutors admonitions inside

the grand jury room ring hollow when they are closely scrutinized.
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The second and equally compelling observation made by
the court has to do with waiver.

It states:

"It would seem that a witness who is unaware
that he is a target of a grand jury investigation could not intelligently determine
whether or not he needed counsel unless he
was fully advised of the charges being
considered against him; and until he has full
knowledge regarding that matter, he will not
know when to assert his constitutional claim
of privilege against self-incrimination. It
would be difficult to believe that he could
intelligently waive the right to counsel
under such circumstances." [Emphasis added.]
429 P.2d at 975.
In this instance, Tolman could neither waive his
rights, nor could he freely and voluntarily elect not to. /8
The apparently universal standard for waiver of a
fundamental constitutional right is "knowing and intelligent"
Boykin v. Alabama, 395 U.S. 238, 89 S.Ct. 1709, 23 L.Ed.2d 274
(1969); Argersinger v. Hamlin, 407 U.S. 25, 92 S.Ct. 2006, 32
L.Ed.2d 530 (1972).

This pertains not only to the knowledge and

understanding of the actual rights involved, but also how they
interface with the nature of the charge.

The Utah Supreme Court

has recently assessed that to mean "real notice of the true
nature of the charge against him, the first and most universally
recognized requirement of due process".

[Citation omitted.]

State v. Gibbons, 740 P.2d 1309 at 1312 (1987).

It would have

been impossible for Tolman to make a knowing and intelligent
waiver of his right to silence or his right to consult and have
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counsel present, since the "real" nature of the charges was never
explained to him.

For this court to infer from the brief record

of the grand jury appearance what was meant by the cursory
admonition is to engage in the kind of speculation v/hich Gibbons
proscribes.

The error of the court in allowing segments of

Tolman's grand jury testimony to be read into the record as
admissions was plain error of constitutional magnitude, which
taken in light of the whole record, cannot be said to be harmless.

State v. Turner, 736 P.2d 1043 (Utah App. 1987).
B. EXHIBITS 30, 31 and 32 WERE NEVER PROPERLY
ADMITTED INTO EVIDENCE, AND THEREFORE SHOULD
NOT HAVE BEEN AVAILABLE FOR JUROR SCRUTINY
Exhibits 30, 31 and 32 (excerpts of Tolman's grand jury

testimony) were introduced by the prosecutor and read into the
record by the court clerk.

(R. 530, T. 33-56.)

Exclusive of the

foregoing discussion, at no place on the record are these exhibits properly offered nor does the court ever rule them received//9 For that reason, those exhibits and their reference in
the record should be stricken and not further considered by this
court as part of the evidence adduced against Tolman.
C. THE COURT ERRED ON SPECIFIC RULINGS
REGARDING ADMISSIBILITY OF EVIDENCE
MATERIAL TO THE CHARGES AGAINST TOLMAN
Throughout trial, objections were routinely raised
regarding admission of certain documentary and testimonial
evidence.

Court rulings on evidence will only be considered

harmful error if there is showing that it had a substantial
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influence in bringing about the verdict.

State v. Malmrose, 649

P.2d 56 (1982) .
Mike Christensen took the stand prepared to testify
about observations and conversations he had had with Tolman
during August, 1983.

These occurrences exactly coincided with

the time frame when all of Tolman's alleged illegal conduct was
supposed to have been transpiring.

Through some tortured manipu-

lation of Rule 801, Utah Rules of Evidence, the prosecution
convinced an obviously fatigued court that for Mr. Christensen to
testify as to what lie said and observed was improper.
is absurd,

The ruling

and effectively negated all the relevant testimony

of Christensen on the most critical issues of the case.
TOLMANfS CONVICTION ON COUNT IV CANNOT STAND
BECAUSE 76-8-508(1)(b) IS UNCONSTITUTIONAL OR
THE JURY WAS IMPROPERLY INSTRUCTED ON THAT COUNT
D.

Tolman1s conviction on Count IV was predicated upon
conduct which is not proscribed by §76-8-508(1)(b).

A literal

reading of that portion of the statute fails to adequately inform
what conduct is prohibited.

If, however, the statute is held to

adequately give notice of what constitutes criminal conduct, the
court erred in failing to instruct the jury that attempts to
induce a withholding of evidence must relate to the official
proceeding believed to be pending,
1. Section 76-8-508(1)(b) is overly broad and vague so
as to be declared unconstitutional.
In this case, Tolman was convicted of violating
76-8-508(1) (b), Utah Code Annotated (as amended) which provides:
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"A person is guilty of a felony in the third
degree if:
(1) Believing that an official proceeding or
investigation is pending or about to be
instituted, he attempts to induce or otherwise cause a person to:
* * *

(b) Withhold any testimony, information,
document or thing; . • ."
That portion of the statute is unconstitutionally vague
and overly broad.

Sub part (b) mandates that no "testimony,

information, document, or thing" may be withheld.
is, withheld from what?

The question

One can only presume the legislature

meant withheld from the official proceeding believed to be
pending or about to be instituted.

As shall be demonstrated, the

absence of some clear nexus between subpart (b) and subsection
(1) makes it a crime to have a belief coupled with an unrelated
act.
Traditionally, constitutionality of statutes must be
presented to the District Court before they can be raised on
appeal.

Salt Lake City v. Perkins, 9 Utah 2d 317, 343 P.2d 1106

(1959); Neilson v. Eisen, 116 Utah 343, 209 P.2d 928 (1949);
Wagner v. Olsen, 25 Utah 2d 366, 482 P.2d 702 (1971).

This rule

applies unless the statute is so plainly unconstitutional that
failure to raise the issue sua sponte on the part of the District
Court is considered clear error.

State v. Laird, 601 P.2d 926,

927, n. 6 (1979); see Page v. United States, 282 F.2d 807 (8th

-23-

Cir. 1960).

The court may entertain an issue sua sponte as an

exception to the rule that constitutional objections must be
raised at the trial level before being raised for the first time
on appeal if the court considers the constitutional right to be
of momentous concern.

State v. Pierce, 655 P.2d 676, 677 (1982);

State v. Schad, 24 Utah 2d 255, 470 P.2d 246 (1970); State v.
Cobo, 90 Utah 89, 60 P.2d 952 (1936).
This rule has been applied less stringently, however,
in more recent cases.

In State v. Fritt, 23 Utah 2d 365, 463

P.2d 806 (1970), because the defendant did not raise the issue of
the statute's validity at the trial court level or at the appeal
level, the court held there was no justification for dealing with
that issue.

It could be inferred from reading the court's

decision that if the defendant had raised the issue of the
statute's unconstitutionality at either level, the court would
have felt justified in making a determination of the issue.
Therefore, even though the defendant did not raise the issue at
trial, the reviewing court may have proceeded to deal with the
constitutionality of the statute, for the first time, at the
appeal level of the proceeding.
The Supreme Court in State v. Laird, 601 P.2d 926
(1979), held that the defendant was precluded from challenging
the constitutionality of a "carnal knowledge" statute because he
did not raise the issue for a determination by the District
Court, or make any motion or objection to that court which would
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"remotely preserve this issue for our determination".
927.

Ij3. at

The court was looking for any objection or motion, however

remote, to support a determination of this issue.

In the instant

case, Tolman took the occasion to object on the record to the
instruction, stating that it created an offense out of a mere
belief coupled with an unrelated act, or "strict liability".
532, T. 1428.)

(R.

By that, Tolman sought to preserve this issue and

is entitled to raise it here.
The recent decision of State v. Breckenridge, 688 P.2d
440 (1983), held:

"[T]he general rule that constitutional issues

not raised at trial cannot be raised on appeal is excepted to
when a person's liberty is at stake".

^Id. at 443; citing Pratt

v. City Council of City of Riverton, 639 P.2d 172, 173-74 (1981).
An earlier case supported this precedent, which involved an
appellant attacking the constitutionality of a Utah statute and
it was decided that if the liberty of an appellant is jeopardized, constitutional issues may be raised for the first time
on appeal.

In Re Woodward, 14 Utah 2d 336, 384 P.2d 110 (1963).

"[E]ven in the absence of proper objection, we may review error
in the interests of justice to protect a valuable constitutional
right."

State v. Cook, 714 P.2d 296, 297 (1986); State v. Schad,

supra; State v. Smith, 16 Utah 2d 374, 401 P.2d 445 (1965).
A statute this vague falls within the confines of the
standards set out by the Supreme Court for finding a statute
unconstitutional

State v. Carlsen, 638 P.2d 512 (Utah 1981),
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held that, "[I]n order to find a statute unconstitutionally
vague, this court must determine that it 'failed to inform an
ordinary citizen who is seeking to obey the laws as to the
conduct sought to be prescribed.1"

I_d. at 515, citing State v.

Bradshaw, 541 P.2d 800, 802 (Utah 1975).

An ordinary citizen

would be unclear as to what "thing" included or excluded, and
certainly could not be able to express what act relates to what
proceeding.

This drafting is unconstitutional because of its

facial ambiguity.

"There is no doubt that a statute that affec

fundamental liberties is unconstitutional if it is so vague tha
persons of common intelligence must necessarily guess at its
meaning."

State v. Lindquist, 674 P.2d 1234, 1236 (Utah 1983);

In Re Boyer, 636 P.2d 1085, 1088 (Utah 1971); State v. Packard,
122 Utah 369, 374, 250 P.2d 561, 563 (1952).

"When a state

action impinges on fundamental rights, due process requires
standards which clearly define the scope of permissible conduct
so as to avoid unwarranted intrusion on those rights."

In Re

Boyer, 636 P.2d at 1087-88.
The United States Supreme Court has aptly stated:
"It is established that a law fails to meet
the requirements of the Due Process clause if
it is so vague and standardless that it
leaves the public uncertain as to the conduct
it prohibits or leaves judges and jurors free
to decide, without any legally fixed standards, what is prohibited and what is not in
each particular case."
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Id. at 1088, citing Giaccio v. Pennsylvania, 382 U.S. 399, 401,
402-03 (1966); See also Grayned v. City of Rockford, 408 U.S. 104
(1972).
The statute in question has once been scrutinized for
constitutional validity, albeit regarding subsections (l)(d).
State v. Carlsen, 638 P.2d 512 (1981).

While Tolman intends to

rely upon Carlsen to support his argument, the most obvious
difference between that case and this is both subsection (1) and
subpart (d) refer to a "proceeding", thus demonstrating the
legislative intent to tie the belief to the act with a common
proceeding as the conduit.

Clearly, such is not the case with

subsections (l)(b).
The court in Carlsen indicated that a statute similar
to our own had been upheld against constitutional challenges in
State v. Stroh, 91 Wash.2d 580, 588 P.2d 1182 (1979).

That case

construes a statute which is drafted in such a fashion as to
foreclose any argument of vagueness or overbreadth./ll In Stroh,
the court ruled that the statute need not expressly include as an
element the intent to obstruct justice, since the legislature
determined that "attempts to influence a witness to change his
testimony or to absent himself from a trial or other official
proceeding, necessarily have as their purpose and it is their
natural tendency to obstruct justice".

The court goes on to

state that "the intent to perform the acts proscribed by the
statute, with knowledge or reason to believe that the person is
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or probably is about to be called as a witness, conclusively
shows an intent to obstruct justice".

[Emphasis added.]

Id.

It cannot be gainsaid that §76-8-508(1)(d) severs the
marriage between such knowledge or belief and the conduct proscribed.

Plainly read, any person who knows any official pro-

ceeding is pending and attempts to induce or otherwise cause any
person to withhold any testimony, information, document or thing
/12
has committed a third degree felony.

For that reason, the

court is compelled to find this statute vague and overly broad,
and thus held unconstitutional.

Therefore, Tolman's conviction

cannot stand.
2. The court erred by giving Instruction Number 3d in
favor of Tolmanfs offered instruction.
Even if the statute in question passes constitutional
muster, the court erred in failing to instruct the jury that the
inducement necessarily relates to the official proceeding.

Rule

19(c), Utah Rules of Criminal Procedure indicates that error may
be assigned to instruction with or without objection.
Turner, 736 P.2d 1043 (Utah App. 1987).

State v.

In that case, this court

stated that improper instructions were used which "violate due
process because they relate to the issue of guilt and relieve the
State of its burden of proof."

I_d. at 1045. As in Turner, the

instant case demonstrates an occasion where the instruction
employed absolved the prosecution from their burden.

The proof

required should have been a showing that the alleged acts were
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somehow related to, and done with knowledge or belief that, the
official proceeding would be affected.

Due to this deficient

threshold of proof, Tolman was convicted on Count IV despite a
more than reasonable doubt of his guilt.
SECTION III. - PROSECUTOR MISCONDUCT
The general conduct of state's prosecutors Keller and
Snow, during the grand jury proceedings and at the trial itself
created such substantial prejudice to Appellant Tolman that
reversal is the only available remedy.
Some of the conduct complained of hereinafter became
apparent during the proceedings below and were timely raised,
however, the court declined to grant Appellant's requested
relief, i.e., mistrial, dismissal, suppression of evidence, etc.
or granted prosecution requests which were prejudicial to Appellant's defense and anathema to Appellant's statutory and constitutional rights.

The incidents of prosecutorial misconduct

and/or errant rulings of the court as set forth hereafter arguably rise to the level of reversible error in each case and
clearly reach that level cumulatively.
A.

APPELLANT TOLMAN WAS SINGLED OUT IN THE
GRAND JURY PROCEEDINGS TO BE DENIED
NOTICE AND EFFECTIVE RIGHT TO COUNSEL

Since this issue is more extensively addressed elsewhere in Appellant's brief, (see Argument, II, A, supra), a
summary is provided merely to demonstrate the initiation of the
prosecution's pattern of conduct directed toward denial of
Appellant Tolman's right to the due process of law.
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In short, Appellant Tolman was the only "target" who
did not receive advance notice of that fact; the only witness who
was denied the right to have counsel present; and the only
eventual Defendant who was not fully apprised of the nature of
the prospective charges,
B.

THE PROSECUTION ATTEMPTED TO BLOCK APPELLANT
TOLMANfS RIGHT TO DISCOVERY AND CONCEALED
POTENTIALLY EXCULPATORY EVIDENCE AT ALL STAGES
Defendant Tolman filed his Motion for Discovery pursu-

ant to Rule 16, Utah Rules of Criminal Procedure, on December 1,
1986.

(R. 59, 60.)
Rule 16, in pertinent part states that the prosecutor

"shall disclose to the defense . . . (4) Evidence known to the
prosecutor that tends to negate the guilt of the accused, (or)
mitigate the guilt of the defendant."
The prosecution opposed providing Appellant with
transcripts of the testimony of grand jury witnesses, although
potentially exculpatory, on various bases.

(See R. 128-134.) A

hearing on Appellant's motion was held on January 30, 1987. The
prosecution argued at various stages that the prosecution should
determine which portions of testimony were relevant and potentially exculpatory; or that the judge should do so; or that
defense counsel be allowed inspection of transcripts under the
continual physical supervision of the prosecution.
Following the hearing, the court ordered the prosecution to supply copies of all grand jury transcripts with any
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reference to the Appellant.
166.)

(See Supplemental Order, R. 165,

Said Order exceeded Rule 16 requirements, clearly obligat-

ing the prosecution to diligently insure that all transcripts of
testimony be provided to the defense irrespective of the prosecution's opinion as to whether the testimony was exculpatory.
In the weeks to come, the prosecution purported to
provide Appellant with copies of all grand jury transcripts, or
portions thereof, which reported the testimony of witnesses whose
testimony purported to inculpate, exculpate or otherwise touch
upon the facts relevant to the Tolman case.

At least, those

transcripts were represented by the prosecution to fully encompass those issues.
Counsel for Appellant Tolman, however, learned in
mid-trial, (the afternoon of February 25, 1987) that a significant witness, Deputy Salt Lake County Attorney Mike Christensen,
had not only given testimony to the grand jury which was
exculpatory in nature, he had done so on more than one occasion.
Further, and even more compelling, the prosecution contacted Mr.
Christensen on February 17, 1987, just prior to trial, to ask why
he was listed as a defense witness, whereupon he made direct
reference to his grand jury testimony concerning his considerable
involvement with the Appellant including testimony which was not
only exculpatory but was in direct contradiction to the prosecutions version of the facts concerning Appellant Tolman's
disclosure of the evidence alleged to have been tampered with,
i.e., the "hidden" fire reports.
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Beginning at page 1037, line 22 of the trial transcript
and concluding at page 1055 is the full scenario of Appellant!s
discovery of said concealment, proffer of the above-stated facts,
oral Motion to Dismiss and argument of counsel.
In addition to Mr. Christensen!s testimony, it was also
learned that the exculpatory testimony of eventual defense
witnesses Shauna Clark and Jim Burns had been concealed, (or at
least not disclosed), both of whom provided testimony which
tended to negate or mitigate Appellant's guilt.
The court (unreported) remedied the failures to disclose by requiring the prosecution to comply with the discovery
order of January 30, 1987, by providing the relevant grand jury
transcripts to Appellant forthwith.
Although the testimony of the above three witnesses is
reported at pages 1160 to 1219 of the trial transcript, it is the
fact of the concealment, not the substance of the testimony that
is at issue.
C. THE PROSECUTION MADE FURTHER ATTEMPTS TO
PREVENT DEFENSE WITNESSES FROM TESTIFYING,
IN PART SUCCESSFUL DUE TO THE COURT'S ERRORS
On the morning of February 27, 1987, Shauna Clark
appeared to testify at trial.

She then provided Appellant's

counsel with a report of two conversations she had with Prosecutor Keller:
1.

On the previous evening he contacted her to inquire

as to what her testimony would be on behalf of Appellant.
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She also stated that Mr. Keller admonished her that her
testimony in this case could adversely impact "her" case then
pending.

(Criminal and civil prosecutions against former county

attorney Ted Cannon alleging sexual misconduct by him against
her.)
2.

Ms. Clark reported that in a courtroom foyer

conversation that morning, before trial convened,

Mr. Keller

told her her being called as a witness was a defense publicity
ploy and that the judge would not allow her to be called as a
witness and that, therefore, she could leave.

(Ms. Clark was

under subpoena at the time.)
Prior to commencement of trial that morning, counsel
convened iin camera at Mr. Keller's request whereupon he indeed,
albeit unsuccessfully, argued for Ms. Clark's disqualification
based on the "grandstanding" issue.

Counsel for Appellant

reported the Keller/Clark discussion and raised objections at
that time, to the undue influence of Mr. Keller regarding the
reported Clark discussions but no misconduct was perceived by the
court.
Clark's later testimony substantially controverted the
testimony of Sam Dawson, a crucial state's witness, and attacked
Mr. Dawson's credibility, honesty and motive (bias).

(T. Tr.

1160-1170.)
Not only did Prosecutor Keller first fail to disclose
probative transcripts of testimony, then attempt to block Clark's
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testimony, extrajudicially and by oral motion, (frivolously so in
light of his knowledge of Ms, Clark's testimony), his disingenuous and misleading abuse of the Rules of Evidence was demonstrated during the testimony of Mssrs. Burns and Christensen.
Each of the above-named such witnesses were called by
Tolman to rebut the prosecution claim that Appellant Tolman
concealed the fact that he had been ordered to suppress his
official report by providing testimony that Tolman had, in fact,
quite openly and boisterously reported and condemned said order
and sought the advice of his peers (and legal counsel) concerning
the efficacy of same.
Each witness was asked to recall their respective
conversations with Mr. Tolman on that subject.

Mr. Keller raised

hearsay objections throughout the examinations as to testimony
regarding what the witness or Appellant Tolman said in said
discussions.
Appellant sought to adduce from each witness the
Appellant's statements (made contemporaneous to the order regarding suppression of his initial fire report) regarding Tolman1s
state of mind, opinions, and assertions of potential evidence
tampering by his supervisors and of reporting the same.

At a

sidebar conference during Mr. Burns1 testimony (T. Tr. 1184) the
court ruled that Appellant Tolman1s statements were inadmissible
hearsay.

Therefore, direct examination ceased.
Inexplicably, the court allowed the next witness, Mr.

Christensen to so testify.

However, the Burns testimony related
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to additional discussions of import and therefore its omission
was not remedied by the admission of Christensen!s testimony.
The Utah Rules of Evidence regarding hearsay (Rule 801,
et seq.) are not so mysterious as to require a protracted discussion.

It is the emerging pattern of obstructing the airing of

admissible evidence that is important.

More importantly, the bad

faith prosecution motives and further tainting of due process,
(as discussed infra), has clearly taken the leap from the
pre-trial stage and invaded the fair and full presentment of both
sides cases in full view of the trial jury.
Mr. Keller chose to "testify" that Appellant had not
expressed his suspicions or unhappiness regarding the "suppressed" fire report to the lawyers and investigators in the
county attorney's office yet continually and frivolously invoked
the Rules of Evidence to prevent the testimony of witnesses to
the contrary to be discovered, provided or offered.
D. THE PROSECUTOR'S REFERENCES TO APPELLANT TOLMAN'S
ABILITY TO TESTIFY IN HIS OWN BEHALF WERE SUFFICIENTLY
PREJUDICIAL, ALONE, TO REQUIRE A MISTRIAL AND THE
COURT'S DENIAL OF APPELLANT'S MOTION TO DO SO WAS ERROR
In the previous discussion regarding Mr. Keller's
hearsay objection to the testimony of witness Christensen as to
prior statements of Appellant Tolman, Mr. Keller, in the presence
of the jury declared, " . . .
to testify.
Tr. 1205.)

I understand

Mr. Tolman is going

He can certainly tell us all about it himself."

(T.

(Mr. Keller had previously made a similar reference

in support of the same objection when the previous witness, Mr.
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Burns, was testifying.)

Defense counsel reserved the objection

for in camera argument as to the misconduct of the prosecutorfs
comments vis1 a vis1 a mistrial.
The unreported in camera argument was noted on the
record when the court reconvened.

(T. Tr. 1225.)

motion for mistrial was taken under advisement.

The oral

Appellantfs

written motion and memorandum were filed with the court on March
30, 1987.

(R. 470.)

The court denied Appellant Tolman's motion,

The prosecution argued, in essence, that Appellant had
waived his privilege of silence because Appellant's counsel had
expressed or implied that Appellant would testify, both in his
opening statement to the jury and in jLri camera discussions of
counsel and the court.
A review of the opening statement reflects that Appellant's counsel was clear in advising the jury of Appellant's
right not to testify and even stated that it would not be proper
to report his expected testimony since the decision to testify
had not been made.

The jury was only advised as to the expected

testimony of other witnesses as to Appellant's defense.

(See

transcript of opening statements, February 18, 1987.)
Appellant's list of expected witnesses, filed on
February 17, 1987, conspicuously omits his own name.

(R. 460.)

As to the state's reliance on In camera revelations or
inferences that Tolman planned to testify in his own behalf as
justification for the comments before the jury, a number of
things can be said:
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1.

There is no such record;

2.

Even if such statements or inferences were made,

there is a distinct reason they occurred outside the presence of
the jury - that is why legal arguments and proffers are done in
camera or at the sidebar - to prevent the jury from hearing them.
3.

Further, any such statements made after Mr,

Keller's comments are hardly surprising.

Once the jury is told

the Appellant will testify, decisions of the defense become
easier.

The damage is done.
E.
1•

THE AUTHORITY SUPPORTS REVERSAL

Privilege Against Testifying.

Under Article I, §12 of the Utah Constitution and
Amendment V of the United States Constitution, a defendant in a
prosecution has the absolute right and privilege of remaining
silent, free of an adverse inference attaching to that silence.
As corollary, it is an elemental tenet of defendant's right to
remain silent that any direct comment by the prosecution regarding the exercise of that right is substantial and prejudicial
error.

State v. Long, 29 U.2d 177, 506 P.2d 1269 (1973); State

v. Bennett, 582 P.2d 569 (Wash. 1978); State v. Morris, 577
S.W.2d 941 (Mo. 1979); State v. McRae, 231 S.E.2d 915 (N.C.
1977); Prince v. State, 620 P.2d 431 (Okla. 1980); Commonwealth
v. Brown, 418 A.2d 573 (Pa. 1980).

The vast body of case law

references comment by the prosecution during closing argument
upon defendant's failure to testify.
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Such is not the case here,

but the comment itself is no less prejudicial under the circumstances.
As noted in many Utah cases, assertion of a privilege
at any stage of the proceeding is not subject to commentary by
the prosecution, and such comment creates prejudicial error.
State v. Brown, 14 U.2d 324, 383 P.2d 930 (1963); State v.
Trusty, 28 U.2d 317, 502 P.2d 113 (1972); State v. Eaton, 569
P.2d 1114 (1977).

The standard for determining whether prejudice

warranting a new trial has arisen is stated in Eaton:
w

[W]hen there is a reasonable doubt as to
whether the error below was prejudicial, that
doubt should be resolved in favor of the
defendant. This is especially true where the
error involved is one that trangresses
against the exercise of a constitutional
right. Consequently, the rule which we have
numerous times stated is that if the error is
such as to justify a belief that it had a
substantial adverse effect upon the defendant's right to fair trial, in that there is
a reasonable likelihood that in its absence
there may have been a different result, then
the error should not be regarded as harmless;
and conversely, if the error is such that it
is clear beyond a reasonable doubt that it
was harmless in that the result would have
been the same, then the error should not be
deemed prejudicial and warrant granting a new
trial."
569 P.2d at 1116.
An example is found in Brown, supra, which involved a
case of defendant invoking spousal privilege.

The prosecutor

commented to the jury that defendant's wife was the one person
who corroborated defendant's alibi.
conviction, the court stated:
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In its ruling reversing the

"If such comment is permissible, the privilege is largely destroyed. We conclude that
this comment destroyed the privilege to not
testify and was prejudicial.n
383 P.2d at 932.
In this case, Defendant had called witnesses in his
behalf but had not yet testified himself.

Upon prosecution's

hearsay objection, Defendant, through counsel, exercised the
Fifth Amendment privilege to demonstrate Defendant's unavailability.

See State v. White, 671 P.2d 191 (1983).

By commenting

before the jury that the witness need not testify because the
Defendant could, the privilege was improperly and irretrievably
invaded.

At that point, the privilege not to testify was effec-

tively wrested from the Defendant so as to avoid the otherwise
impermissible inference to be drawn by the jury.

(The damage was

furthered by the court's discussion of Keller's comments at the
time.)

Rather than rest upon the statements of his witnesses,

the Defendant was compelled to testify to overcome the prosecutor's comments, as well as corroborate his witnesses' statements
which were objected to on hearsay grounds.
The determination of this issue is one which should be
closely scrutinized by this Court, in light of the standard
espoused in Eaton, supra, since the court has "his advantaged
position in proximity to the trial, and his responsibility of
seeing that the proceedings are carried on in a way which will
best serve the purpose of seeking the truth and doing justice by
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seeing that both sides are given a fair trial . . ."

Brownf 502

P.2d at 114.
This Court should reverse the trial court's denial of
Appellant's Motion for Mistrial on this issue alone.
2.

Non-Disclosure of Exculpatory Evidence.

The court's discovery order of January 27, 1987 and the
mandate of Rule 16, both discussed supra, leaves an unequivocal
duty of broad, non-discretionary disclosure of the identities and
recorded grand jury testimony of any witness even conceivably
likely to be a witness with evidence beneficial to the defense.
In State v. Jerrell, 808 P.2d 18 (Utah 1980), a case in
which the prosecutor withheld potentially exculpatory evidence,
the court strongly condemned any attempt to withhold such evidence irrespective of the weight given to it by the prosecutor.
The court recognized the controlling issue as being the need to
air all evidence before the trier of fact whether probative of
guilt or innocence.
Jerrell was cited in Walker v. State of Utah, 624 P.2d
687 (Utah 1981) in reversing a conviction due to the withholding
of potentially exculpatory evidence.

The Walker court held that

that kind of prosecutor misconduct is a violation of the substantive due process right.

The court could find no effective

distinction between the failure to disclose testimony favorable
to the accused and the outright offering of false testimony to
the contrary.
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The importance of the undisclosed testimony is inherent
in the fact that the only witnesses, besides himself, called by
this defendant, were the three witnesses whose recorded testimony
was undisclosed.
The most recent pronouncement of this Court, State v.
Knight, 734 P.2d 913 (1987), further demonstrates the court's
refusal to tolerate prosecutor misconduct evidencing a denial of
a full and fair trial by playing "hide and seek" with discoverable evidence.
Even if, as the prosecution has argued, the
non-disclosure was due to an oversight or an error in judgment
the results are no less prejudicial.
However, it is difficult to conceive that Appellant
Tolman's only three witnesses were the only ones whose testimony
was overlooked by the prosecution, especially where it was called
to their attention by specific reference of one witness just
before trial.

It also is an attenuated definition of coincidence

to assume that Appellant Tolman was the only Appellant to be
deprived of counsel, receive notice, etc.
3.

Cumulative Misconduct.

Although certain of these arguments, if successful,
would customarily result in a new trial this Court must recognize
that taken as a whole, the deprivation of due process is so
substantial as to demand dismissal.

This is especially true when

coupled with the wholesale error and unfairness present in error

-41-

not assignable to the prosecution which occurred throughout the
proceedings below:

No notice of charges before the grand jury;

denial of counsel; denial of a preliminary hearing and a bill of
particulars; determination of relevance of grand jury witness
testimony placed in the prosecution; mid-trial discovery of
concealed evidence; pattern of bad faith obstruction of full
airing of evidence; erroneous and inconsistent rulings on objections and motions; continual "testimony" of prosecutors
including interjection of otherwise inadmissible and/or privileged information; knowing use of biased witnesses; a jury
relying on divine revelation instead of the evidence; attempts by
the prosecutor to dissuade a witness from testifying, to enumerate a few.
The prosecution's best response - closely related to
their explanation for solely denying Appellant Tolman counsel
before the grand jury as being due to their having been then not
yet being fully acquainted with the state law on grand juries sums up the lame, but only viable alternative to assignment of
intentional misconduct:
"We're not regular prosecutors . . . I am a defense
attorney a lot myself now."

(Mr. Keller, T. Tr. 1047.)

SECTION IV - POST-TRIAL ISSUES
Appellant Tolman filed a motion to arrest the judgment
herein pursuant to Rule 23, U.R.Cr.P., on March 30, 1987, based
upon improper jury deliberations.
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The Appellant's memorandum and juror affidavit filed in
support of said motion focused on the issue of mistaken interpretation of the "hung jury" instruction.

The court ruled that it

would not entertain the motion where (a) the juror providing the
affidavit was unavailable in court for cross-examination and (b)
an improper outside influence was not shown.
Appellant supplemented his motion by affidavit of juror
Karl Andersen, dated August 14, 1987.

(R. 554-556.)

A

re-hearing was scheduled for August 19, 1987 and Mr. Andersen and
another juror, Colleen Rosvall, were present pursuant to subpoena.
The arguments of counsel were heard rn camera.

The

affidavit of Mr. Andersen was filed with the court and the
corroborative testimony of Ms. Rosvall were proffered.

Each

juror's testimony went to the issue of improper outside influence
occasioned by the insertion of "God" in the jury room via a group
prayer which resulted in the prayer-leader juror's inspiration or
revelation from God that Appellant Tolman was guilty.

It was

proffered that the inspired juror asserted a great degree of
authority by virtue of his position in the dominant and (apparently) mutual religion (Mormon) of five other jurors whose
opinions were then changed to adopt the divinely inspired leader's conclusion.

Due to the obvious immovable decision of the

other jurors, the mistaken belief that a hung jury was not
possible and the pressure of prospect of spending eternity in
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deliberation, the two "uninspired" jurors acquiesced in the
verdict in spite of their belief that Tolman was not guilty.
The court also revealed that, unknown to Tolman's
counsel, the jury requested a dictionary to ascertain the definition of certain terms set out in the jury instructions.

The

court allowed a dictionary to be delivered to the jury for that
narrow purpose.

Appellant argued the impropriety and prejudice

of that event, as well, by oral supplement.
Mr. Snow, arguing for the State, urged the court to
deny the motion on the grounds that Appellant had not demonstrated prejudicial outside influence or other improper juror or
judicial conduct and that it would be improper to consider the
juror affidavit.

Mr. Snow stated that even if the jury's verdict

was the result of divine inspiration, "who are we to argue with
God?"
In propounding the arguments herein, Appellant is
cognizant of Rule 606(b), Utah Rules of Evidence, which states,
in pertinent part, that juror testimony may not be used to
inquire into the validity of the jury's verdict, " . . . except
that a juror may testify on the question whether extraneous
prejudicial information was improperly brought to the jury's
attention or whether any outside influence was improperly brought
to bear upon any juror."
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A. THE COURT ERRED IN REFUSING TO HEAR JURORS1
TESTIMONY ON THE QUESTION OF "OUTSIDE INFLUENCE"
It is an undeniable fact of life in the State of Utah
that one religion dominates virtually all aspects of life.

The

State Legislature openly acknowledges that the approval of the
Mormon Church's heirarchy is a prerequisite to successful passage
of proposed laws touching upon that religion's tenets.
It is also common knowledge that that church adheres to
a male-only priesthood which governs on the premise that the
church president is a prophet and rules with divine inspiration
and authority which flows from him to the faithful via the
priesthood.

That doctrine is clearly understood in that no

m <mber is empowered to assert the authority of God absent the
requisite leve: : of the priesthood conferred upon him.

It is

equally understood that the assertion of the power of the
priesthood is authoritative, i.e.f done "in the name of Jesus
Christ".
The import of the Andersen affidavit is clear and
manifold:
1.

A jury, after many hours of deliberation, was 6-2

for acquittal;
2.

A juror who asserted his spiritual authority in the

said religion influenced his fellow adherents to submit the
question of guilt to the will of God by joining him in group
prayer;
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3.

Immediately following the prayer, the said juror

expressed the "answer" to the prayer, i.e., that Appellant was
guilty.
4.

Soon thereafter, all prayer participants changed

their opinions to adhere to the "will of God".

A 6-2 vote became

2-6 without further evidentiary considerations.
5.

The six, clearly immovable from an "inspired"

position, were able to force to two to give in.
Whether or not the influence of the prayer-leader's
expressions of spiritual authority which gave rise to the prayer
or his declaration of the divine "truth" were improper influences
or whether the inclusion of God in the deliberations was improper
should have at least been examined by the court.

By excluding

the jurors1 testimony, a proper question of extraneous matters or
outside influence was ignored.
B.

THE CIRCUMSTANCES OP THE JURORS1 PRAYER AND
RELIANCE ON DIVINE REVELATION ARE ERROR

When a juror, during deliberations, expresses to his
fellow jurors facts as being within his personal knowledge and
those facts are material are shown to have influenced the jurors1
votes, the verdict should be vacated.

Martin v. State, 113 So.

602; Ross v. State, 95 So.2d 594; Briggs v. State, 338 S.W.2d
625; State v. Malone, 62 S.W.2d 625.
By first convincing the other jurors to submit the fate
of the accused to prayer, the juror demonstrated that the jury
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was influenced to rely not upon the authority of the court and
their instructions, but to allow the "priesthood" to utilize its
power to seek answers from an outside authority.
When the offending juror then revealed the outside
authority's answers, he was doing so as a conduit of God since
only he was privy to the answers.

In communicating his "personal

knowledge" in such a fashion, the jurors were precluded from
weighing the evidence.

Smith v. Covell, 161 Cal. Rptr. 377

(1980).
The improper effect of the prayer may be viewed in any
number of ways:
1.

The knowledge imparted to the jury through its

"messenger" (the spiritual leader) was additional evidence from
an unsworn witness (God).

In that case evidence was received

outside the forum of open court and the verdict must be invalidated.

Tunmore v. McLeish, 187 P. 443.
2.

God was present in the jury room as a ninth juror.

In this case the revelation was only one vote.
to disagree with God?

But who's going

Besides, only eight jurors are permissi-

ble.
3.

God (or the priesthood thereof) assumed dominion

over the conduct of the proceedings.

It is apparent that four

jurors acquiesced to the authority of the priesthood in relying
on the prayer then changed their votes according to the guidance
of the prayer leader.

If the due process of law was being
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administrated by the authority of the Mormon priesthood, the
inviolate doctrine of separation of church and state is prejudicially tainted.
4.

Constitution of Utah, Article I, Section 4.

The verdict was submitted to chance.

Implicit in

the vote swing is the conclusion that a vote of acquittal would
have followed the divine revelation of "not guilty".
Therefore, the six jurors were flipping a spiritual
coin.

If God says "guilty" (heads) we vote for conviction . . .

if God says innocent (tails) we vote for acquittal.

Chance

verdicts are verdicts submitted to decisions determined by the
outcome of a non-evidentiary event such as a coin flip.
verdicts are impermissible.

Chance

State v. Gee, 28 U.2d 96 (1972);

State v. Couch, 635 P.2d 89 (Utah 1981); Groen v. Tri-O-Inc., 667
P.2d 598 (Utah 1983).
5.

The juror who received the revelation from God

engaged in an unpermitted conversation.

Prejudice will be

presumed from any contact between jurors and others that goes
beyond mere incidental, unintended conduct.

State v. Erickson,

73 Utah Adv. Rep. 15, (December 31, 1987.)
In this case the "conversation" was intended and was
engaged for a substantial purpose, i.e., to seek the ultimate
answers.
C.

THE VERDICT RESULTED FROM IMPROPER
TAINT AND IMPLIED INTIMIDATION

The Andersen affidavit shows that he never believed in
Appellant's guilt but changed his vote after several days of
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deliberation only because of the clear prospect of spending
eternity in the jury room once the divine intervention created
the intractable position of the majority coupled with the erroneous belief that the jury could not "hang".

A new trial should be

granted where all but one juror has found a verdict of guilty,
and that one juror finally agrees on such a verdict because he
was, in a sense intimidated into voting for conviction.

Bell v.

State, 161 S.W.2d 109 (Texas).
The intimidation factor should be examined with greater
concern given the length of the deliberation herein as well as
the late hour of the verdict.
D. THE COURTfS DELIVERING A
DICTIONARY TO THE JURY WAS ERROR
The Utah Supreme Court has held that it is misconduct
for the court to allow the jury to receive a dictionary during
its deliberations.

State v. Donald, 63 P.2d 246 (Utah, 1936).

That court found the court's misconduct to be harmless.

However,

in this case the error was not learned by Appellant until the
jury was long-since excused and the record silent as to the
circumstances.

The silence should not be inferred as being

non-prejudicial.
E. THE CUMULATIVE ERROR REGARDING
JURY DELIBERATIONS WEIGHS PREJUDICIAL
The jury in this case retired to the jury room having
heard prosecutor comments which invaded Appellant's privilege
against testifying.

It therefore heard testimony it might not
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have.

It heard hearsay evidence on the premise it was only

relevant to the conspiracy charge.
spiracy.

Yet the jury found no con-

So its deliberations undoubtedly included weighing

hearsay evidence on the substantive charges.
It received evidence and instructions to which Appellant assigns error.

It relied on evidence which had been con-

cealed from the defense until shortly before it was presented.
This was a jury which was unaware it could "hang" and
only agreed on a verdict after days of deliberation into the wee
hours after improperly viewing a dictionary and after following
the guidance of the extrajudicial authority of a spiritual leader
who claimed to speak not from the evidence but from God.
The cumulative error relating to the conduct of the
jury deliberations weighs heavily in favor of reversing this
verdict.

Although the burden of invading the jury room is a

strong one, the scrutiny with which the court should examine the
possibility of outside influence is immediate and careful.

The

Erickson court affirmed the principle that any apparent influence
beyond the incidental, unavoidable circumstance will necessarily
negate the verdict of the jury.

In spite of the deference given

to the province of the jury, harmless error will never be
presumed when it is shown that even one juror may have relied on
something other than the evidence.
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SECTION V - SUFFICIENCY OF EVIDENCE
THE EVIDENCE ADDUCED AT TRIAL IS INSUFFICIENT
TO SUSTAIN A CONVICTION ON COUNTS IV AND V
Again, Tolman raises an issue addressed by his
co-appellant, Harman, and joins that argument.

The evidence

overwhelmingly exculpates Tolman from any criminal liability
under Counts IV and V.

Vis a vis those charges the following

salient events were described at trial:
1.

Dean Larsen investigates the Fashion Place fire and

makes a public statement about cause and origin.
2.

Jim Ashby is hired by county as an independent fire

investigator and refutes Larsen's statement, resulting in publicity adversely affecting Larsen.
3.

Ashby solicits Tolman to play mediator, then sends

copy of his report to Larsen in attempt to get Larsen to "reconsider his opinion".
4.

(R. 536, T. 637.)

Larsen pressures Tolman for copy of his report in

order to support Larsen's position.
5.

Soon after it is prepared by Joan Binkard, a copy

of Tolman's report goes to Murray Fire Department even though the
original has not been approved by Harman.
6.

Larsen finds Tolman's report does not support

Larsen's opinion as much as he wants because Tolman forms no
opinion as to cause.
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7.

Larsen is told by Tolman that if Harman finds out

the report was released prior to approval, Tolman could have
trouble on the job.
8.

Fifteen months later, Larsen uses that as an excuse

to lie in deposition about Tolman's report and avoid further
diminuition of his investigation's credibility.
9.

Through independent sources, evidence begins to

mount that perhaps Larsenfs opinion is wrong.
10.

In December, 1985, Larsen finds Tolman's report in

Chief Coombs1 office after a 45 minute search following request
from civil attorney Tom Green.
There exists no evidence that, in August, 1983, Tolman
knew or believed that Larsen was going to testify in an official
proceeding.

Moreover, there is no evidence that Tolman attempted

to induce Larsen to withhold Tolman's report from an official
proceeding./13 Dean Larsen mistook his own self-interest for an
act of friendship, willfully failed to testify about Tolman's
report, which led to Tolman being accused of hiding the report.
The ultimate fact in this melodrama is that Larsen lied /14 after
Tolman told him not to.
Tolman.

There were no crimes committed by Ralph

Even when the evidence is reviewed in the light most

favorable to the jury verdict, the convictions simply cannot
stand.

State v. Nickles, 728 P.2d 123 (1986).
CONCLUSION
Grand jury prosecutions in Utah have a long and doleful

history.

This matter should be reversed and ordered dismissed by
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this court, or in the alternative remanded for new trial.
DATED this

/Cp day of March, 1988.

LONI F. D e L A N D /
Attorney for Appellant Tolman

SCOTT W. REED
Attorney for Appellant Tolman
CERTIFICATE OF MAILING
I HEREBY CERTIFY that on the

day of March, 1988,

a true and correct copy of the foregoing was mailed, with postage
prepaid fully thereon, to the Utah Attorney General, 236 State
Capitol, Salt Lake City, Utah 84114; and Edward K. Brass, 321
South 600 East, Salt Lake City, Utah 84102.
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FOOTNOTES

The crime of Tampering with Evidence was never proven as to
either Defendant, nor were they convicted of such crime.
2/
In fact, this Indictment was subsequently amended prior to
trial (R. 178-185), but none of the fatal deficiencies previously
evidenced were rehabilitated. Therefore, the proper remedy was
dismissal prior to trial, or amendment sufficient to obviate the
error.
3/
At the
Tolman was
point to a
to "demand
Article I,

least, the court should have ruled that although
arraigned on the charges, he was entitled at some
probable cause hearing in order to insure his rights
the nature and cause of the accusations against him".
Section 12, Utah Constitution.

4/
' Rev. St. 1933, 105-21-9, as amended by Laws 1935, c. 118,
provided in pertinent part, "the court . . . shall at the request
of the defendant, order the prosecuting attorney to furnish a
bill of particulars . . . "
[Emphasis added.]
5/
"Evidence" which was primarily hearsay, highly inferential,
and which purported to imply some criminal intent merely by its
existence, rather than bv some rational or demonstrable nexus to
any actus reus of a crime.
On the issue of conspiracy, the following ruling was made:
"Based on the testimony that has been given so far, the court is
of the opinion that the evidence does show that there is some,
either whether you call it cover-up or some evidence that would
indicate that there is, on the part of the parties involved, an
effort not to have the report that is the subject matter of this
particular hearing [sic] not to be divulged publicly as far as
the records of the county attorney is concerned." (R. 535, T.
868.)
7/
That segment reads:
Mr. Keller: All right.

[with emphasis added]
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This investigation, Mr. Tolman, concerns your
possible preparation of a report in August, 1983,
which was supplemented by a second report some time
later, involving a fire which occurred on May 1st,
1983 at the Fashion Place Mall. Do you understand
that's the subject of our inquiry at this time?
A:

Yes sir, I do,

Q:

All right.

Mr. Snow:

And that involves possible charges or allegations
regarding tampering with evidence or suppressing
evidence that should be part of an official
proceeding. You understand that?

The Witness: Yes, sir.
8/
For Tolman to exercise his right to counsel after being sworn
as a witness may have had an irreparably suggestive effect upon
the grand jurors. Hypothetical outcomes not withstanding, it was
a scenario which never should have occurred.
9/
The evidence log (R. 346) does indicate those exhibits to
have been "admitted". They were not, however, offered or received as were Exhibits 33-44. (R. 530, T. 57-58.)
' Assuming, arguendo, that 801 prohibits a witness from
testifying as to what he/she said, but not what they are saying
now 803 (24) provides an exception so long as circumstantial
guarantees of trustworthiness exist. The fact that a witness is
under oath seems to insure that he/she will restate accurately
that which he/she once stated while not under oath; thus making
what was said then circumstantially trustworthy.
11

'
Provided at Addendum A-7 is RCW9A.72.120, as well as the two
corollary statutes on witness interference. Each relates the
proscribed act to the official proceeding pending, which
§76-8-508 does not.
12/
' Stated in hypothetical form, Bob (any person) knows his wife
is contemplating filing for divorce (any official proceeding) and
attempts to induce his neighbor, Bill (any other person), to
withhold his garbage from trash collection (any thing). While
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the requisite elements of the statute have been fulfilled, it
seems that unless there is something in Bill's garbage that
pertains to the divorce, there is no crime.
' Dean Larsen was deposed twice, appeared before the grand
jury, and testified at trial. Likewise, Tolman was twice
deposed, gave grand jury testimony on two occasions and appeared
at trial. Either directly through those two witnesses, or
indirectly by hearsay through Harrington, Yearby, Ashby and
Coombs, the following descriptive verbiage was attributed to
Tolman's directions to Larsen regarding the report: "destroyed
or burned or something" (R. 536, T. 492-593, 1. 20-25, 1-5),
"destroy" (R. 536, T. 665, 1. 5-8), "shred the report" (R. 536,
T. 666, 1. 8-13), "torn up" (R. 535, T. 869, 1. 17-18), "destroy
it or tear it up" (R. 535, T. 869, 1. 20-21), "get rid of it,
destroy it, whatever you have to do" (R. 535, T. 919, 1. 9-13),
"merely wanted the fact that you had the report concealed from
Mr. Harman" (R. 537, T. 960, 1. 18-21), "not disclose" (R. 537,
T. 961, 1. 8-11), "not to physically get rid of that report but
to conceal the fact it went to you from this man" (R. 537, T.
1006-1007, 1. 23-25, 1-3), "get the report back or have it deep
sixed" (R. 530, T. 19, 1.21-25), "eat it, put it on your walls"
(R. 530, T. 36, 1. 11-23). Regardless of which of these terms
was actually used, Tolman never attempted to induce Larsen to
withhold the report from the official proceeding. In fact, the
opposite is true, and Larsen claims never to have had physical
control over the document at any time prior to Mr. Green's
request to produce it. (R. 535; T. 914, T. 920, T. 924, T. 928,
T. 935.)
7

He lied in his first deposition clearly. Upon
cross-examination by Mr. Brass, he admitted to certain untruths
in his second deposition. (R. 537, T. 969-972.) Then, at trial
he contradicted himself twice alone on the single issue of
whether he concealed the Tolman report. (R. 537, T. 956, 980,
999-1002.)
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ADDENDUM

1

MEMORANDUM IN SUPPORT OF MOTION TO QUASH COUNT I

2

MEMORANDUM IN SUPPORT OF MOTION FOR PRELIMINARY
EXAMINATION

3

MOTION AND MEMORANDUM FOR A BILL OF PARTICULARS

4

MEMORANDUM AND AFFIDAVITS ON MOTION TO SUPPRESS
STATEMENTS

5

INDICTMENT

6

AMENDED INDICTMENT

7

REVISED CODE WASHINGTON 9A.72 SECTIONS .085-.120

8

INSTRUCTION NUMBER 38

9

TOLMAN'S PROPOSED INSTRUCTION NUMBER 12

10

SUPPLEMENTAL ORDER

11

DEFENDANT TOLMAN'S LIST OF WITNESSES

12

MOTION FOR ARREST OF JUDGMENT

13

MOTION FOR MISTRIAL

14

AFFIDAVITS OF KARL ANDERSON (2)

15

ORDER DENYING DEFENDANT RALPH TOLMAN'S MOTION FOR A NEW
TRIAL
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Attorney:: for Defendant Tolman
IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT
IN AND FOR
SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH
STATE OF UTAH,
MEMORANDUM IN SUPPORT
OF MOTION TO QUASH
COUNT I

Plaintiff,
V.

DONALD CLAUDE HARMAN and
RALPH TOLMAN,

Case No. CR-86-1522
Judge Raymond Uno

Defendants.
The Defendant, Ralph Tolman, herein moves the court
pursuant to Rule 12(b)(1), Utah Rules of Criminal Procedure
(77-35-12, Utah Code Annotated) to quash or otherwise dismiss
Count I of the indictment in that it fails to adequately charge
the offense of Criminal Conspiracy under Utah Code Annotated
§76-4-201 (1953 as amended).
FACTS
Count I of the indictment alleges that Defendant Tolman
committed Criminal Conspiracy by intending to commit the crime of
Tampering with Evidence pursuant to an agreement to do so with
co-defendant Harman.

"A-l"
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The factual allegations purport that the co-defendants
entered into the said agreement on August 1, 1983, whereby they
conspired to conceal Defendant Tolman f s seven-page investigative
report as to the origin and cause of a fire which established
potential liability in Salt Lake County and further conspired to
have Defendant Tolman prepare and submit a false one-page report
which would omit the conclusion giving rise to the said liability.
ARGUMENT
Count T is fatally defective in that it doer; not alleae
facts sufficient to establish the elements necessary to charge
Defendant with a crime for which he may be prosecuted.
To persuade the court to allow further prosecution of
Criminal Conspiracy, §76-4-201, Utah Code Annotated, the factual
allegations must, on the face of the charging document, be
sufficient, if proved, to actually constitute a violation of each
element of the crime.
Therefore, the facts must demonstrate:
(1)

An agreement between these co-defendants, entered

into on August 1, 1983;
(2)

To engage in conduct constitution the crime of

Tampering with Evidence in violation of §76-8-501;
(3)

While possessing the intent to commit the said

crime (Tampering), and
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(4)

Thereafter commit an overt act in furtherance of

the said agreement.
For purposes of this part a person is guilty
of conspiracy when he, intending that conduct
constituting a crime be performed, agrees
with one or more persons to engage in or
cause the performance of such conduct and any
one of them commits an overt act in pursuance
of the conspiracy.
76-4-201.
The element of "engaging in conduct" requires factual
allegations sufficient to show that the mutual intent of the
conspirators was to successfully satisfy each element of the
underlying offense.
A person commits a felony of the second
degree, if believing that an official proceeding or investigation is pending or about
to be instituted, he:
(1) Alters, destroys, conceals, or removes
anything with a purpose to impair its verity
or availability in the proceeding or investigation; or
(2) Makes, presents, or uses anything
which he knows to be false with a purpose to
deceive a public servant who is or may be
engaged in a proceeding or investigation.
§76-8-501.
Since the State pleads the underlying offense in the
disjunctive, either of which constitutes the crime of Tampering,
it should be presumed that the agreement is alleged to have
encompassed both the destruction or concealment of the seven-page
report (76-8-501(1)) as well as the presentment of the substitute
false one-page report (76-8-501(2)) several weeks later.
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A.

No Agreement is Factually Alleged.

The primary element of Conspiracy, i.e., an agreement
to commit a crime, is not alleged.

An "agreement" implies a

meeting of the minds, privity of intent or some such factual
pleading to charge that a mutuality of common design was reached.
However, the State's own pleading at page 2, paragraphs
(a) and (b) provide the only facts of any such agreement; however, the facts only allege that Defendant Harman "rejected"
Defendant Tolman's seven-page report and ordered him as a superior to a subordinate, to prepare another (the one-page) report.
The State's facts may show Defendant Tolman
acquiescence to the orders of a superior but do not allege an
agreement to jointly conceal or destroy the first report.
Further, every agreement at law requires express or
implied acceptance to be bound thereby.

Defendant Tolman's

acquiescence is not alleged to occur until August 25, upon
submission of the second report.
B.

Elements Constituting "Tampering" Under Either

Alternative, Have not been Alleged vis-a-vis the Conspiracy
Elements.
1.

If Defendants conspired to violate Section (1) of

the Tampering statute, i„e., to alter, conceal, destroy or remove
something to impair its verity or availability, such acts could
only apply to a then-existing "something" viz., the seven-page
report.
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However, the State alleges no after occurring overt
acts in violation of the charge.

Overt acts (a) and (b) of Count

I do not occur in furtherance of the agreement but, in fact are
the acts of Harman which the State claims are the agreement from
Harman's position,

Tolman's acquiescence to Harman's orders,

thereby satisfying the State's curious definition of "agreement11
was not an overt act but merely the finalization of the pact.
Therefore, the only act that could be construed as one in furtherance of the conspiracy would be Harman's approval of the
second report.
Therefore, there are no overt acts in furtherance of
the agreement to conceal the first report alleged.
is

The opposite

alleged, i.e., inaction.
Further there is no allegation that the seven-page

report was altered, concealed, destroyed, etc.

There is no

allegation even referring to said report after its rejection by
Harman.
2.

As to the second alternative "tampering" violation,

the State has utterly failed to allege one key element and cannot
demonstrate another, i.e., falsity.
Clearly this charge can only refer to the one-page
report.

Nowhere in the pleading has the State identified who the

public servant is who Defendants intended to deceive by the
second report.

According to the State's information, all the

deception concerning the juggling of reports was done tr£ the
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public servants, not to them.

It was the private plaintiffs in

the civil action attendant the fire who were deceived.
Tf it is assumed that an agreement was entered at some
point between August 1 and August 31, 1983, there is still no
basis to charge conspiracy upon the overt acts (c) and (d).
Neither of those alleged acts demonstrates that Defendants
intended conduct constituting a crime pursuant to that agreement
be performed.

The conduct does not demonstrate pursuit of

76-8-501(1) for the reason that nothing was altered, destroyed,
concealed or removed.

Nor does it show intent to violate

76-8-501(2) for the simple reason that the one-page report was
not alleged to have been known to be false.
In summary, the allegations as set forth in Count I
establish no basis for a belief as to unity of design or purpose
or concert of will of Defendants so as to demonstrate an agreement.

Moreover, even if an agreement is presumed, there are no

overt acts established in furtherance of such agreement.

The

State has also failed to establish Defendant Tolman's intent to
violate

76-8-501(1) or (2) and have not alleged facts to show

the elements thereof were the same conduct to which Defendants1
acts were designed to violate.

Therefore, Count I is defective

on its face and should be dismissed.
DATED this ^ /

day of January, 1987.

LONI F. D e L A N D ' (
Attorney for Defendant Toliran
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?T W. REED*
Attorney for Defendant: Tolman
CERTIFICATE OF MAILING
I HEREBY CERTIFY that on the ^(

day of January,

1987, a true and correct copy of the foregoing was mailed, with
postage prepaid fully thereon, to Larry R. Keller, #8 East
Broadway, Judge Building, Suite 426, Salt Lake City, Utah 84111;
Rodney G. Snow, American Plaza, 77 West 200 South, Salt Lake
City, Utah 84101; and Edward K. Brass, 321 South 600 East, Salt
Lake Citv, Utah 84102.

D.tfru.
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LONI F. DeLAND
hSCOTT W. REED
McRAE & DeLAND
132 South 600 East
Salt Lake City, Utah 84102
Telephone: (801) 364-1333
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%

Attorneys for Defendant Tolman
IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT
IN AND FOR
SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH
STATE OF UTAH,
Plaintiff,
V.

)
)
)

MEMORANDUM IN SUPPORT
OF MOTION FOR PRELIMINARY
EXAMINATION

CLAUDE DONALD HARMAN and
RALPH TOLMAN,

)
)

Case No. CR 86-1522

Defendants.

)
INTRODUCTION

The issue raised by this motion is whether Defendant,
having been charged by grand jury indictment, is entitled to
receive a preliminary hearing upon the charges contained therein.
It is Defendant's position that, indeed, he is afforded the right
to preliminary examination in this case and denial of that right
would violate Utah State constitutional provision as delineated
in Sections Seven, Twelve and Thirteen of Article I, Utah Constitution.

"A-2"
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I.

THE RIGHT TO PRELIMINARY HEARING IS A
SUBSTANTIAL RIGHT IN UTAH

The United States Supreme Court has ruled that while a
state is not required to provide preliminary hearing as a federal
constitutional right, such hearings where granted under state law
fall within the purview of Sixth Amendment rights.

Coleman v.

Alabama, 399 U.S. 1, 90 S.Ct. 1999, 26 L.Ed. 387 (1970).

Using

"critical stage" analysis, that court found the preliminary
hearing was an important procedure in allowing defendant
opportunity to answer and defend against criminal charges, and
that counsel was essential to protect the accused against
improvident prosecution.
The Utah Constitution provides specific protections to
persons charged with crimes. Under Article I, §12 a person has
the right "to demand the nature and cause of the accusation
against him" [emphasis added].

Article I, §7 states that "no

person shall be deprived of life, liberty or property without due
process of law".

These provisions as read together guarantee

that all criminal defendants be accorded certain substantial
rights before being convicted of a crime, including the right to
preliminary hearing.

State v. Anderson, 612 P.2d 778 (1980).

Utah has long held the right to preliminary examination
to be a substantial right.

State v. Pay, 45 U. 411, 146 P. 300

(1915); State v. Overson, 55 U. 230, 185 P. 364 (1919).

It is a
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right which cannot be waived except by the Defendant,
waived is absolute and not generally subject to review.

and once
State v.

Freeman, 93 U. 125, 71 P.2d 196 (1937); State v. Knill, 656 P.2d
1026 (1982).

II.

PRELIMINARY HEARING SHOULD NOT BE
PRECLUDED BY INDICTMENT

The threshold question to be addressed is whether an
indictment absolutely precludes the right to preliminary hearing.
An overview of federal and sister state jurisdiction indicates
the contrary and that the procedural mechanisms employed determine the necessity of such hearing.

Moreover, some jurisdictions

hold that the rights of the accused are so fundamental that no
procedural avenues may be obviated.
A.

Federal System

The right to preliminary hearing in the federal criminal justice is contained in Title 18 U.S.C. §3060 and Rule 5(c)

Rule 7 of Utah Rules of Criminal Procedure (77-35-7 Utah Code
Ann., as amended) further indicates the consent of the prosecuting attorney is likewise required before a magistrate may bind
the defendant over to district court for trial.
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of the Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure,

Under the rule, a

defendant who answers to a criminal complaint is entitled to
preliminary hearing unless, between the filing of the complaint
and the time set for preliminary hearing, an intervening
indictment is returned.

Several federal circuit courts have held

that return of an indictment renders the statutory right to
preliminary hearing moot.

See Sciortino v. Zampano, 385 F.2d 132

(2nd Cir. 1967) .

The pertinent portion of Rule 5(c) provides:
A defendant is entitled to a preliminary
examination, unless waived, when charged with
any offense, other than a petty offense,
which is to be tried by a judge of the
district court. If the defendant waives
preliminary examination, the magistrate shall
forthwith hold him to answer in the district
court. If the defendant does not waive the
preliminary examination, the magistrate shall
schedule a preliminary examination. Such
examination shall be held within a reasonable
time but in any event not later than 10 days
following the initial appearance if the
defendant is in custody and no later than 20
days if he is not in custody, provided,
however, that the preliminary examination
shall not be held if the defendant is indicted or if an information against the defendant
is filed in district court before the date
set for the preliminary examination.
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It is most important to note two things regarding the
federal procedure:

Grand jury indictment is the general
3
rule rather than the exception in the federal system, and
(2)

(1)

the statute and the corresponding procedural rule on

preliminary hearing contemplate indictment after the initial
appearance before the magistrate.

Because the federal courts

rely primarily upon indictment rather than information, the
corresponding federal procedures can be distinguished from Utah
proceedings on that basis alone.

The federal system has not developed in the absence of
some commentary about the desirability of requiring preliminary
hearingf as demonstrated by the following analysis presented to
the Subcommittee on Improvement in Judicial Machinery, Senate
Judiciary Committee, 89th Congress, 2nd Session (1966).
[T]he purpose of a commissioner's hearing is
not only to have another determination of
whether there is probable cause, but to do so
in an adversary proceeding. This is why a
defendant is given the right to
cross-examine, to call witnesses and to
testify in his own behalf. * * * There is no
reason to assume that the adversary system is

The Fifth Amendment of the United States Constitution mandates
grand jury presentment or indictment in order to commence action
upon infamous or capital crimes. Rule 7 of the Federal Rules of
Criminal Procedure indicates that all felonies must be prosecuted
by indictment, unless the defendant waives that right in open
court.

oooo/o

less suitable for finding the truth before
trial when the standard of proof is probable
cause than it is at trial when the standard
is beyond a reasonable doubt, * * * We
should not forget that we are dealing with
people and public institutions. I think that
fundamental fairness requires that a citizen
who has been deprived of his liberty have an
opportunity to determine the charge against
him from a judicial officer and to confront
either his accuser or the police in a judicial setting as soon as it is feasible to
provide the opportunity. * * *
Hearings on U.S. Commissioner System, at 270-71.
Similarly, the A.L.I. Model Pre-Arraignment Code,
§§330-340 (1975) proposes that substantial rights of the defendant are better satisfied by preliminary hearing than by grand
jury proceeding.

The Code provides that:

(1) a preliminary hearing automatically
shall be scheduled in each case; (2) the
defendant shall be deemed to have waived
indictment by electing to utilize the hearing; and (3) issuance of a prior indictment
"shall not terminate [defendant's] right to a
preliminary hearing.
The rationale of such a rule is based upon policy
considerations that a grand jury indictment is not an adequate or
fair substitute for a preliminary hearing.
It is clear that while F.R.Cr.P. 5(c) is similar in
content to Rule 7(c) of the Utah Rules of Criminal Procedure,
77-35-7(c) Utah Code Annotated (as amended), the procedural
context within which those rules are employed are as different as
apples and oranges. Therefore, the prevailing federal system
imposes no prohibitive effect upon Utah law.
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B.

Indictment States

Many states have taken the federal courts lead in
requiring grand jury indictment for prosecution of felony matters.

Likewise, the process of preliminary hearing is provided

for, but may be mooted by return of indictment prior to hearing.
The primary reliance upon the indictment process
distinguishes these states from Utah.

It is interesting to note,

however, that at least two states allow the defendant to request
a preliminary hearing and an indictment in felony matters.

See

Commonwealth v. Nelson, 230 Pa. Super. 89, 326 A.2d 598
(Pennsylvania, 1974); Moore v. State, 578 S.W.2d 78 (Tennessee,
1979).

Again, this recognition supports the contention that a

preliminary hearing in open court is an essential element of any
criminal proceeding, regardless of the nature of its commencement .
C.

Information States

Utah is among approximately thirty state jurisdictions
in which criminal proceedings may commence by indictment or
information.

See Rule 5, Utah Rules of Criminal Procedure (1980,

As of 1979, the total number of "indictment states" was
twenty, with five additional states requiring indictment in
capital cases. Utah is not among these jurisdictions.

as amended).

The heavy use of the information alternative serves

to characterize these states as "information states".
Many of these states have not ruled on the propriety of
pre-arrest indictment vis-a-vis the right to preliminary hearing.
Three states, however, have rejected the view that a grand jury
indictment eliminates the need for a preliminary hearing.

Stone

v. Hope, 488 P.2d 616 (Oklahoma Cr. App. 1971); People v. Duncan,
388 Mich. 489, 201 N.W.2d 629 (Michigan, 1972); Hawkins v.
Superior Court, 22 Cal. 3d 584, 150 Cal. Rptr. 435, 586 P.2d 916
(California, 1978) . The Hawkins court based its decision upon
state constitutional grounds of equal protection, grounds which
had previously been rejected in California.

The court further

referred to Coleman v. Alabama, supra in noting the value to
defendant of a preliminary hearing.

The court also observed:

The grand jury is independent only in the
sense that it is not formally attached to the
prosecutor's office; though legally free to
vote as they please, grand jurors virtually
always assent to the recommendations of the
prosecuting attorney, a fact borne out by
available statistical and survey data. * * *
The pervasive prosecutorial influence reflected in such statistics has led an impressive array of commentators to endorse the
sentiment expressed by United States District
Judge William Campbell, a former prosecutor:
"Today, the grand jury is the total captive
of the prosecutor who, if he is candid, will

A minority of these states allow "direct filing", which may
circumvent any right to preliminary hearing. Certain special
requirements attach in these jurisdictions to insure that the
information is supported by probable cause. Utah observes no
such procedure.
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concede that he can indict anybody, at any time, for
almost anything before any grand jury."
586 P.2d at 919.
Particularly in an "information state" such as Utah,
the procedural safeguards otherwise provided by preliminary
hearing are not satisfied by rusty machinery of a seldom-used
grand jury system, and therefore, should not preclude defendants'
substantial right to such hearing.
III.

UTAH LAW DOES NOT PROHIBIT PRELIMINARY
HEARING IN THE INSTANT CASE

At first blush, the strongest argument against Defendant's contention appears to be a recitation of the last sentence
in Rule 7(c), U.R.Cr.P. which simply states "A preliminary
examination shall not be held if the defendant is indicted."
Close scrutiny of this statement within the procedural context of
7(c), coupled with the provisions of Article I, §13 of the Utah
Constitution, reveals such simplistic reasoning as clearly
fallacious.
Initially, it is indisputable that Utah's Rule 7(c)
reads essentially the same as paragraph two of Federal Rule 5(c),
supra.

In fact, the only substantial difference between the two

is that the extension provision and the proscription of preliminary hearing are juxtaposed.

Unfortunately, Utah's aforemen-

tioned proscription clause is silent as to whether its application is contingent, as is the federal rule, upon the return of an
indictment after initial appearance but before the date set for

GOOO:'4

preliminary hearing"

The plain meaning of the statute read as a

whole supports the conclusion that the intention was to mirror
the federal rule.
Absent any legislative directive to the contrary, the
statute cannot be construed to prohibit preliminary hearing
absolutely, since this would contravene the specific provisions
of Article I, §13, which provides:
Offenses heretofore required to be prosecuted
by indictment, shall be prosecuted by information after examination and commitment by a
magistrate, unless the examination be waived
by the accused with the consent of the State,
or by indictment, with or without such
examination and commitment. The formation of
the grand jury and the powers and duties
thereof shall be as prescribed by the Legislature. [Emphasis added].
The constitutional provision allows for preliminary
examination in cases brought by indictment.

That guarantee may

not be tacitly denied merely on the basis of an ambiguous legislative enactment.
It is for the reasons stated above that Defendant is
entitled to, and therefore respectfully requests preliminary
hearing on the matters presently situated before this Court.

The legislative record is similarly mute as to the legislative
intent to be attached to this provision. C. 1953, 77-35-7,
enacted by L. 1980, ch. 14, §1.

OOQO

DATED this 3 /

day of/octobe
LONI F. IbeLAND"
Attorney for Defendant/Tolman

?T W. REED
Attorney for Defendant"Tolman
CERTIFICATE OF MAILING
I HEREBY CERTIFY that on the 3 /

day of October,

1986, a true and correct copy of the foregoing was mailed, with
postage prepaid fully thereon to Edward K. Brass, Attorney for
Defendant Harman, 321 South 600 East, Salt Lake City, Utah 84102;
Larry R. Keller, 8 East Broadway, #426, Salt Lake City, Utah
84111; Rodney G. Snow, 200 American Savings Plaza, 77 West 200
South, Salt Lake City, Utah 84101.

/22

^uO

nonoc'*ct

LONI F. DeLAND
SCOTT W. REED
McRAE & DeLAND
132 South 600 East
Salt Lake City, Utah 84102
Telephone: (801) 364-1333
Attorneys for Defendant Tolman
IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT
IN AND FOR
SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH
THE STATE OF UTAH,
MOTION FOR A BILL OF
PARTICULARS

Plaintiff,
V.

DONALD CLAUDE HARMAN and
RALPH TOLMAN,

Case No. CR-86-1522
Judge Raymond Uno

Defendants,
Defendant, Ralph Tolman, by and through his attorneys,
Loni F. DeLand and Scott W. Reed, moves the court pursuant to
Rule 4(3), Utah Rules of Criminal Procedure, 77-35-4 (amended
1980) , to order the production of a statement of particular
factual information regarding the following:
1. With regard to Count I and Count II:
a.

State the exact date, time, location and general

nature of the agreement constituting the conspiracy as charged in
Count I.
b.

State the intended conduct constituting a crime and

by whom the conduct was performed.
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c.

Describe the nature of the official proceeding or

investigation pending or about to be instigated.
d.

State the specific basis for alleging that Defen-

dant Tolman believed such proceeding or investigation as described above was pending or about to be instigated.
e.

State the specific manner in which Defendant Tolman

is alleged to have altered, destroyed, concealed, or removed the
investigative report.
f.

Specify what presentation or use of a false report

was made by Defendant Tolman for the purpose of deceiving a
public servant or servants, and specify which public servant(s).
2.

With regard to Count IV:

a.

State the specific acts alleged to have been

committed by Defendant Tolman to induce or cause C. Dean Larsen
to withhold testimony, information documents or things.
b.

Specify which element of testimony, information,

document or thing was alleged to have been the subject of such
inducement or cause, beside the seven page report.
c.

State whether said report was in fact withheld by

C. Dean Larsen.
d.

State the date, time, location and general nature

of acts alleged.
e.

Describe the nature of the official proceeding or

investigation which was pending or about to be instituted.
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f.

State the specific basis for alleging that Defen-

dant Tolman believed that such proceeding or investigation as
described above was pending or about to be instituted.
3. With regard to Count V:
a.

State the specific nature of the benefit or harm

intended by Defendant Tolman.
b.

State the specific acts which Defendant Tolman

performed or failed to perform.
c.

State the specific basis upon which it is alleged

that the acts or omissions performed by Defendant Tolman were
knowingly performed.
DATED this

I

day of December, 1986.

LONI F. D e L A N D '
Attorney for Defendant Tolman

-T&P

SCOTT W. REED
Attorney for Defendant Tolman
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CERTIFICATE OF MAILING
I HEREBY CERTIFY that on the

/

day of December,

1986, a true and correct copy of the foregoing was mailed, with
postage prepaid fully thereon, to Larry R. Keller, #8 East
Broadway, Judge Building, Suite 426, Salt Lake City, Utah 84111;
Rodney G. Snow, American Plaza, 77 West 200 South, Salt Lake
City, Utah 84101; and Edward K. Brass, 321 South 600 East, Salt
Lake City, Utah 84102.
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FILED IN CLERK'S OFFICE
Sa'.t Lake Ccunty. Utah

LONI F. DeLAND (0862)
SCOTT W. REED (4124)
McRAE & DeLAND
132 South 600 East
Salt Lake City, Utah 84102
Telephone: (801) 364-1333

. . ' I ! 2 2 1937

Attorneys for Defendant Tolman
IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT
IN AND FOR
SALT LAKE COUNTY, PWTE Of UTAH
STATE OF UTAH,

v.

I
1

MEMORANDUM IN SUPORT
OF MOTION FOR BILL
OF PARTICULARS

DONALD CLAUDE HAPMAN and
RALPH TOLMAN,

i

Case No. CR-86-1522

1

Judge Raymond Uno

Plaintiff,

Defendants.

]

The Defendant, Ralph Tolman, moves the court to grant
motion pursuant to Rule 4(3), Utah Rules of Criminal Procedure,
77-35-4(3) Utah Code Annotated (amended 1980) for further factual
information so as to adequately inform Defendant of the nature
and cause of the offenses charged.
ARGUMENT
Each of the crimes which Defendant Tolman is charged
with require that Defendant has certain prior knowledge or
information or that he acts with some specific intention.
Additionally, each of the statutes charged rely on alternative
elements for their proof.

G00G89

The Defendant is entitled to know the specific nature
of the acts alleged to fulfill the elemental requirements of each
statute, short of a demonstration of actual evidence to be used.
State v. Moraine, 25 U.2d 51, 475 P.2d 831 (1970); State v.
Mitchell, 57] P.2d 1351 (1977).
DATED this

day of January, 19 87.

L 0 N I F 7 DeLAND
{
Attorney for Defendant Tolman

SCOTT W. REED
Attorney for Defendant Tolman
CERTIFICATE OF MAILING
I HEREPY CERTIFY that on the ^Qf

day of January,

1987, a true and correct copy of the foregoing was mailed, with
postage prepaid fully thereon, to Larry P. Keller, #8 East
Broadway, Judge Building, Suite 426, Salt Lake City, Utah 84111;
Rodney G. Snow, American Plaza, 77 West 200 South, Salt Lake
City, Utah 84101; and Edward K. Brass, 321 South 600 East, Salt
Lake City, Utah 84102.

£)Ub?u
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FILED IN CLERK'S OFFICE
Salt Lake County Utah

LONI F. DeLAND (0862)
SCOTT W. REED (4124)
McRAE & DeLAND
132 South 600 East
Salt Lake City, Utah 84102
Telephone: (801) 364-1333
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Attorneys for Defendant Tolman
IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT
IN AND FOR
SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH
STATE OF UTAH,
Plaintiff,

MEMORANDUM

v,

Case No. CR 86-1522

CLAUDE DONALD HARMAN, and
RALPH TOLMAN,

Judge Raymond Uno

Defendant.
FACTS
On April 9, 1986, Ralph R. Tolman appeared before the
Salt Lake County Grand Jury pursuant to a subpoena issued by
authority of that body.

At no time prior to his appearance was

he informed that he was a subject or "target" of the Grand Jury
investigation.
As Tolman was being brought before the Grand Jury for
testimony, he was instructed orally by Special Prosecutor Larry
Keller that he was a "target".

When Tolman stated that he no

longer wished to remain to testify, Keller then stated that

000188
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Tolman must stay pursuant to the subpoena, as well as the documents Tolman had brought.
On the record before the Grand Jury, it was "suggested"
that Tolman was a subject of the investigation and that he had a
right to have counsel "present" outside the Grand Jury room.
(Tolman testimony, April 9, 1986, p.2.)

At no point was Tolman

informed of the potential charges against him.
It should be noted that at least two other potential
subjects of the Grand Jury investigation received letters so
informing them in advance of their appearance before the Grand
Jury.

(Harman testimony, April 17, 1986, p.5; Dawson testimony,

April 15, 1986, p.2.)
ARGUMENT
With regard to the appearance and testimony before the
Grand Jury of an investigation subject or "target", the Utah
Supreme Court has ruled that such person is more than just a
witness, but an accused within the meaning of Article I, Section
Twelve of the Utah Constitution.
429 P.2d 969 (1967).

State v. Ruggeri, 19 U.2d 216,

In that case, a county commissioner named

Brady was subpoenaed before the Grand Jury but not informed that
he was a target of the investigation.

Based upon his testimony,

Brady was subsequently prosecuted for perjury.

Prior to trial,

the district court judge (Ruggeri) granted a motion to suppress
the use of said testimony as evidence.

000189
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The plaintiff filed a proceeding before the Supreme
Court for a writ to compel Ruggeri to reverse his decision, which
the Supreme Court declined to do.

The court also ruled that:

". . . one being investigated for crime is
not just a witness and cannot be treated as
such. The target of an investigation is an
accused within the meaning of the Constitution, and when he is detained in any significant way, he may not be interrogated unless
he is advised of the charges against him then
under consideration. To fail to so warn one
so being investigated is to entrap him and to
violate his constitutional privilege against
self-incrimination."
429 P.2d at 973. [Emphasis added.1
The court further observed that the violation occurs notwithstanding any assertion of Fifth Amendment privilege, and that the
immunity is complete.
The court concludes its observation as follows:
"It would seem that a witness who is unaware
that he is a target of a grand jury investigation could not intelligently determine
whether or not he needed counsel unless he
was fully advised of the charges being
considered against him; and until he has full
knowledge regarding this matter, he will not
know when to assert his constitutional claim
of privilege against self-incrimination. It
would also be difficult to believe that he
could intelligently waive the right to
counsel under such circumstances."
429 P.2d at 975.
It is clear that Tolman had no notice of his target
status prior to appearance at the Grand Jury.

Once at the Grand

Jury, his appearance was "custodial" requiring complete Miranda
admonition.

As in Ruggeri, it is difficult to believe Tolman

000190
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could be fully apprised of his rights unless he had known and had
the opportunity to share with counsel his status as a subject.
For that reason alone the indictment should be quashed
or the testimony suppressed as evidence against either Defendant.
DATED this

/ 3 day of February, 1987.

^LONl F. D e L A N D '
Attorney for Defendant Tolman

SCOTT W. REED
Attorney for Defendant Tolman
CERTIFICATE OF DELIVERY
I HEREBY CERTIFY that on the

|3

day of February,

1987, a true and correct copy of the foregoing was hand-delivered
to Larry R. Keller, Judge Building, #426, 8 East 300 South, Salt
Lake City, Utah 84111; Rodney G. Snow, 77 West 200 South, Salt
Lake City, Utah 84101; and Edward K. Brass, 321 South 600 East,
Salt Lake City, Utah 84102.
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RODNEY G. SNOW (3028)
200 American Savings Plaza
77 West 200 South
Salt Lake City, Utah 84101
Telephone: (801) 322-2516

F/LEO IN CLERK'S OFFICE
Ca.t Uk<3 County, uiah

0C

?

LARRY R. KELLER (1785)
#8 East Broadway
Judge Building, Suite 426
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111
Telephone: (801) 532-7282

9 1986

Oeouty Clerk

Special Counsel and Prosecutors Pro Tempore —
Salt Lake County Special Grand Jury, 1986 Term

IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT IN AND FOR
SALT LAKE COUNTYr STATE <:]• 7AH
STATE OF UTAH.

Case No,
Plaintiff,

CLK

/g- /s>t x.

I N D I C T M E N T
VIO. U.C.A. § 76-4-201
(CRIMINAL CONSPIRACY);
U.C.A. S 76-8-508
(TAMPERING WITH WITNESS);
U.C.A. S 76-8-510
(TAMPERING WITH EVIDENCE);
U.C.A. S 76-8-201
(OFFICIAL MISCONDUCT)

vs.
^ONALDy^LAUD^HARMAN r and
RkfePOTOLMAN,
Defendants.

THE 1986 SPECIAL SALT LAKE COUNTY GRAND JURY CHARGES:
COUNT I
\0

'^

(CRIMINAL CONSPIRACY)

^

Beginning from on or about August 1, 1983 through on or about
August 31, L98I, in SdIt Lake County, intending that conduct constituting a crime be performed, and believing that an official proceeding

"A-5'
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or

investigation

was pending or about

to be instigated,

Defendants

Donald Claude Harraan and Ralph Tolraanf then investigators of the Salt
Lake County Attorney's office, conspired, combined, confederated and
agreed with each other to conceal or remove a report, to impair the
report's verity or availability, or to make, present or use a false
report to deceive a public servant

or servants, said reports having

been prepared by Defendant Tolman regarding the origin of a fire that
occurred

on or about

May 1, 1983

at the Fashion Place Professional

Plaza, Salt Lake County, that involved the destruction of County and
private property.
In

furtherance

of

the

conspiracy

and

to

effect

the

objects

thereof, the following overt acts were committed:
(a)
Chief

On or about August 1, 1983, Defendant Harman, the then

Investigator

rejected

Defendant

of

the Salt

Tolman 1 s

Lake

County

August 1,

1983,

Attorney's office,
seven-page

report

about the origin of the Fashion Place Professional Plaza fire;
(b)

On

instructions

or

about

August 1, 1983, Defendant

to Defendant

Harman

issued

Tolman to write a brief or one-page

report closing his investigation into the origin of the Fashion
Place Professional Plaza fire;
(c)

On or about August 25, 1983, Defendant Tolman submitted

to Defendant Harman a one-page report which eliminated any reference to Defendant Tolman's opinion as to the origin of the fire;
(d)
and

On or about August 25, 1983, Defendant Harraan accepted

approved

Defendant

Tolman's

report

of

August 25, 1983

as

-2-

000003

Defendant Tolman's official report regarding his investigation
t h e F a s h i o n PI a t. t,ji P r o t e s s i o n a I PI a 2 d f i r e ;
a l l i n v i o l a t i o n of U t a h <'o<l<» A n n

§ 76-4-201, a felony of the Third

Degree.

COUNT II
syv

id
J^u

v
I

.•. .

(TA MPERING WITH EVIDENCE)

That during the month of August 1983, in Salt Lake County, believ-

ing that an official proceeding or investigation wan pending 01 about,
to be instituted, Defendants Donald Claude Harman and Ralph Tolman did
alter, destroy, conceal, <

t htj pui-pose 10 1 mpci

of August 1, ] 983, with
ability

remove Ralph Tolman's investigative report
;:: verity or avail-

in an official proceeding or investigation which was then

pending or about to be instituted; all in violation of Utah Code Ann.
S 76-8-5.1

- 'iiy of the Second Degree.
COUNT III

On ^

(TAMPERING WITH A WITNESS - DONALD CLAUDE HARMAN)
That during the month of August 1983, In Salt Lake County, believ-

ing that dii ol!' ic 1 a,i proceeding << 1 lovesti gat ion was pending or about
to be instituted, Defendant Donald Claude Harman did attempt to induce
or otherwise cause Defendant Ralph Tolman to withhold testimony, m f o r mat i on,

document,

investigative

report

or

thing,

wit:

of August 1, 1983

Fashion Place Professional
Ann, % 7 b 8-50 8

to

Ralph

Tolman's

regarding

the May

seven-page
1,

1983

Plaz<:t f111 ep ill in violation ot; Utah Code

a felony of the Third Degree.
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COUNT IV
(TAMPERING WITH WITNESS - RALPH TOLMAN)
During the month of August 1983, in Salt Lake County, believing
that an official proceeding or investigation was pending or about to
be instituted, Defendant Ralph Tolman did attempt to induce or otherwise cause C. Dean Larsen to withhold testimony, information, document, or thing, in that Defendant Tolman requested C. Dean Larsen to
destroy
report

or

dispose

of Defendant

Tolman's seven-page

investigative

of August 1, 1983 regarding the May 1, 1983 Fashion Place

Professional

Plaza

fire;

all

in

violation

of

Utah

Code

Ann*

S 76-8-508, a felony of the Third Degree.

COUNT V
sr>V

fVV
T i

(OFFICIAL MISCONDUCT - UNAUTHORIZED ACTS OR FAILURE OF DUTY)
During the month of August 1983, in Salt Lake County, Defendants

Ralph Tolman and Donald Claude Harman, then investigators for the Salt
Lake County Attorney's office and public servants, with the intent to
benefit themselves or another, or to harm another, knowingly committed
unauthorized acts which purported to be acts of their office, or knowingly refrained from performing a duty imposed upon them by law or
clearly inherent in the nature of their office, in that said Defendants

altered,

destroyed,

concealed

or

removed

Ralph

Tolman1s

seven-page investigative report of August 1, 1983 regarding the May 1,
1983 Fashion Place Professional Plaza fire, with the purpose to impair
its verity or availability in an official proceeding or investigation

-4-
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which was pending or about to be instituted; H 1.1 in violation <>1 utan
Code Ann. § 76-8-20 1, a Class B Misdemeanor.
DATED this 9th day of October, 1986.

ru&y

J©HNSON

Foreperson, Salt Lake County Special
Grand Jury, 1986 Term

SUBSCRIBED AND SWORN

> before me !•...

f^dd-.

October, 1986

^rcvc^s-^
NOTARY PUBLICv
Residing in Salt Lake County, Utah
My Commission Expires:
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RODNEY G. SNOW (3028)
200 American Savings Plaza
77 West 200 South
Salt Lake City, Utah 84101
Telephone: (801) 322-2516
LARRY R. KELLER (1785)
#8 East Broadway
Judge Building, Suite 426
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111
Telephone: (801) 532-7282
Special Counsel and Prosecutors Pro Tempore —
Salt Lake County Special Grand Jury, 1986 Term

IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT IN AND FOR
SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH
STATE OF UTAH,

Case No. CR-86-1522
Plaint if r',

vs.
CLAUDE DONALD HARMAN, and
RALPH TOLMAN,
Defendants,

AMENDED INDICTMENT
VIO. U.C.A. SS 76-4-201, 76-8-510
(CRIMINAL CONSPIRACY, CONSPIRACY
TO TAMPER WITH EVIDENCE);
U.C.A. S 76-8-510
(TAMPERING WITH EVIDENCE);
U.C.A. S 76-8-508
(TAMPERING WITH WITNESS);
U.C.A. S 76-8-201
(OFFICIAL MISCONDUCT)

THE 1986 SPECIAL SALT LAKE COUNTY GRAND JURY CHARGES:
COUNT I
(CRIMINAL CONSPIRACY, CONSPIRACY TO TAMPER WITH EVIDENCE)
Beginning from

on oi

about August 1, 1983 through on or about

August 31, 1983, in Salt Lake County, intending that conduct constituting a crime be performed, and believing that an nffiriai proceeding

"A-6"
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or

investigation was pending or about to be instituted,

Defendants

Claude Donald Harman and Ralph Tolman, then investigators of the Salt
Lake County Attorney's office, conspired, combined, confederated and
agreed with each other to alter, destroy, conceal or remove a report,
with a purpose to impair the report's verity or availability in the
proceeding

or

investigation,

or

to make, present

or use a

report,

which Defendants knew to be false, with a purpose to deceive a public
servant or servants who were or may have been engaged in an official
proceeding

or

investigation,

said

reports

having

been

prepared

by

Defendant Tolman regarding the origin of a fire that occurred on or
about May 1, 1983 at the Fashion Place Professional Plaza, Salt Lake
County, that involved the destruction of County and private property.
In

furtherance

of

the

conspiracy

and

to

effect

the

objects

thereof, the following overt acts were committed:
(a)
Chief

On or about August 1, 1983, Defendant Harman, the then

Investigator

rejected

Defendant

of

the Salt

Tolman's

Lake County

August 1,

1983,

Attorney's

office,

seven-page

report

about the origin of the Fashion Place Professional Plaza fire;
(b)

On

instructions

or

about

August 1, 1983, Defendant

to Defendant

Harman

Tolman to write a brief or

issued

one-page

report closing his investigation into the origin of the Fashion
Place Professional Plaza fire;
(c)

On or about August 25, 1983, Defendant Tolman submitted

to Defendant Harman a one-page report which eliminated any reference to Defendant Tolman's opinion as to the origin of the fire;

-2-
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(d)
and

On ot about August 25, 1.983, Detendant: Harman accepted

approved

Defendant

Tolman's

report

of August 25, 1983

as

Defendant Tolman's official report regarding his investigation of
the Fashi oi i PJ ace Professional Plaza fire;
all in violation of Utah Code Ann. SS 76-4-201 and 76-8-510, a felony
of the Third Degree.

COUNT II
(TAMPERING WITH .EVIDENCE)
That during the month of August 1983, in Salt Lake County, believing that an official proceeding or investigation was pending or about
ro tie instituted, Defendants Claude Donald Harman and Ralph Tolman did
alter, destroy, conceal,

•, remove Ralph Tolman's investigative report

of August i, 19P3, with

c;pose """.u impair it verity or availability

in an official proceeding

investigation; all in violation of Utah

Code Ann. § 76-8-510, a felony of the Second Degree.

COUNT III
(TAMPERING WITH A WITNESS • CLAUDE DONALD HARMAN)
That during the month of August 1983/ in Salt Lake County, believing that an official proceeding or investigation was pendinq oi abuut
to be instituted/ Defendant Claude Donald Harman did attempt to induce
or otherwise cause Defendant Ralph Tolman to withhold testimony/ information/

document,.

investigative

lepoti, ot

thingr

to

wit:

August 1 , ] 983

Ralph

Tolman's

regarding

the

seven-page
May

lr

198 3

oooia7

fashion Place Professional Plaza fire; all in violation of Utah Code
Ann. S 76-8-508, a felony of the Third Degree.

COUNT IV
(TAMPERING WITH WITNESS - RALPH TOLMAN)
During the month of August 1983, in Salt Lake County, believing
that an official proceeding or investigation was pending or about to
be instituted, Defendant Ralph Tolman did attempt to induce or otherwise cause C. Dean Larsen to withhold testimony, information, document, or thing, in that Defendant Tolman requested C. Dean Larsen to
destroy
report

or

dispose

of Defendant

of August 1, 1983

Professional

Plaza

fire;

Tolman1s

seven-page

investigative

regarding the May 1, 1983 Fashion Place
all

in

violation

of

Utah

Code

Ann.

S 76-8-508, a felony of the Third Degree.

COUNT V
(OFFICIAL MISCONDUCT - UNAUTHORIZED ACTS OR FAILURE OF DUTY)
During the month of August 1983, in Salt Lake County, Defendants
Ralph Tolman and Claude Donald Harman, then investigators for the Salt
Lake County Attorney's office and public servants, with the intent to
benefit themselves or another, or to harm another, knowingly committed
unauthorized acts which purported to be acts of their office, or knowingly refrained from performing a duty imposed upon them by law or
clearly inherent in the nature of their office, in that said Defendants

altered,

destroyed,

concealed

.4.

or

removed

Ralph

Tolman1s

00019 8

seven-page investigative report of August lf 1983 regarding the May lf
1983 Fashion Place Professional Plaza fire, with the purpose: to impair
its verity 01 ,*v*ai i at)i 1 i ty in dn official proceeding or investigation
which was pending or about to be instituted; all in violation of Utah
Code Ann. S 76-8-201, a class B Misdemeanor.
DATED thiy 9th day of October, 1986.

JUDY JOHNSON
Foreperson, Salt Lake County Special
Grand Jury, 1986 Term

SUBSCRIBED AND SWORN to before me this

day *

-

-

6.

NOTARY PUBLIC
Residing in Salt Lake County, Utah
My Commission Expires:

Witnesses examined before the Grand Jury on these charges:

1.
2.
3.
4.
5.
6.
7.
8.
9.
10.
11.
12.
13.
14.
L5.
L6.
L7.

C. Dean Larsen
Wendell Coombs
Ralph Tolman
Bill Hyde
Donald Claude Harman
Walter R. "Bud" Ellett
Aaron Alma Nelson
Gary Ferguson
Gary Johnson
Roger Livingston
Theodore L. Cannon, Jr.
01in Yearby
Jim Ashby
Sam Dawson
Ralph Crockett
A. Evan Stephens
Glen Bammerlin
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9A.72.070

WASHINGTON CRIMINAL CODE

Jury instructions.
False swearing, definition, see Wash.
Prac vol. 11, WPIC 118.10.
Oath, definition, see Wash.Prac. vol.
11. WPIC 118.15.

Perjury, first decree, definition, sec
Wash.Prac. vol. II, WPIC 118 01
Perjury, second degree, definition
sec Wash.Prac. vol 11 W P I P I I O '
'
"" I 1 8 05

9A.72.080. Statement of what one does not know to be true
Every unqualified statement of that which one does not know to
be true is equivalent to a statement of that which he knows to be
false.
Enacted by Laws 1975, 1st Ex.Sess., ch. 260, § 9A.72.080.
Historical Note
Source;

Code 1881, §§ 872, 873.
Laws 1909, ch. 249, §§ 104 to 106.

RRS §§ 2356 to 2358.
Former §§ 9.72.060 to 9.72.080
Laws 1957, ch. 46, § 2.

Library References
Perjury <£=12.
C.J.S. Perjury § 6 et seq.
Jury instructions, perjury or false
swearing, statement of what one

9A.72.085.

does not know to be true, see Wash.
,182,
u
wpIC

Prac> voj

Matters in official proceeding required to be supported, etc., by sworn statement, etc., may be
supported, etc., by unsworn written statement,
etc—Requirements of unsworn statement, form

Whenever, under any law of this state or under any rule, order,
or requirement made under the law of this state, any matter in an
official proceeding is required or permitted to be supported, evidenced, established, or proved by a person's sworn written statement, declaration, verification, certificate, oath, or affidavit, the
matter may with like force and effect be supported, evidenced,
established, or proved in the official proceeding by an unsworn
written statement, declaration, verification, or certificate, which:
(1) Recites that it is certified or declared by the person to be true
under penalty of perjury;
(2) Is subscribed by the person;
(3) States the date and place of its execution; and

9A.72.090

PERJURY

"I certify (or declare) under penalty of perjury under the laws of
the State of Washington that the foregoing is true and correct":
(Date and Place)
(Signature)
This section does not apply to writings requiring an acknowledgement, depositions, oaths of office, or oaths required to be taken
before a special official other than a notary public.
Enacted by Laws 1981, ch. 187, § 3.
Library References
Garnishment, intervention by adverse claimants, see Wash.Prac.
vol. 15, Orland and Tegland,
§ 542.
Garnishment, quashing the writ
when improperly issued, see
Wash.Prac. vol. 15, Orland and
Tegland, § 532.
Garnishment, termination of garnishment, see Wash.Prac. vol. 15,
Orland and Tegland, § 539.
Garnishment, when answer is disputed, see Wash.Prac. vol. 15, Orland and Tegland, § 537.
General contempt statute, see Wash.
Prac. vol. 15, Orland and Tegland,
§ 633.
Replevin, procedure, see Wash.Prac.
vol. 15, Orland and Tegland,
§ 552.
Criminal practice, criminal jurisdiction and venue in general, see Wash.
Prac. vol. 12, Ferguson. § 1601.
Orland and Tegland, § 525.

Civil practice,
Attachment, affidavit, see Wash.
Prac. vol. 15, Orland and Tegland.
§ 503.
Cost and attorney's fees, cost bill,
see Wash.Prac. vol. 15, Orland and
Tegland, § 451.
Executions, adverse claims, summary procedure, see Wash.Prac. vol.
15. Orland and Tegland, § 488.
Executions, affidavit of judgment
creditor, see Wash.Prac. vol. 15,
Orland and Tegland, § 472.
Executions, notice requirements, see
Wash.Prac. vol. 15, Orland and
Tegland, § 482.
Executions, redemption generally,
redemption by judgment debtor,
see Wash.Prac. vol. 15, Orland and
Tegland, § 495.
Executions, stay of execution, see
Wash.Prac. vol. 15, Orland and
Tegland, § 483.
Garnishment, application for writ,
affidavit, sec Wash.Prac. vol. 15,

'9A.72.090.

Bribing a witness

(1) A person is guilty of bribing a witness if he offers, confers, or
agrees to confer any benefit upon a witness or a person he has
reason to believe is about to be called as a witness in any official
proceeding or upon a person whom he has reason to believe may
have information relevant to a criminal investigation, with intent
to:
(a) Influence the testimony of that person; or

(4) States that it is so certified or declared under the laws of the
state of Washington.

(b) Induce that person to avoid legal process summoning him to
testify; or

The certification or declaration may be in substantially the following form:

(c) Induce that person to absent himself from an official proceeding to which he has been legally summoned.

400

401

I

9A.72.090

WASHINGTON CRIMINAL CODE

(2) Bribing a witness is a class B felony.
Enacted by Laws 1975, 1st Ex.Sess., ch. 260. § 9A.72.090.
L a w s 1982. 1st Ex.Sess.. ch. 47, § 16.

A m e n d e d by

Historical Note
Laws 1982 1st Ex.Sess., ch. 47, § 16 Source:
inserted "or upon a person whom he has
Laws 1854, p. 89, § 71.
reason to believe may have information '
Laws 1859, p. 118, § 71.
relevant to a criminal investigation," in
Laws 1869, p. 216, § 77.
subsec. 1.
Laws 1873, p. 199, § 81.
Code 1881, § 877.
Severability—Laws 1982. 1st Ex.
Laws 1909, ch. 249, § 71.
Sess., ch. 47: See Historical Note followRRS § 2323.
ing § 9.41.190.
Former § 9.18.040.
Cross References
Bribery and corrupt influence, see ch. 9A.68.
Witness asking or receiving bribe, see § 9A.72.100.
Library References
Bribery <3^1(1).
C.J.S. Bribery § 1 et seq.
Notes of Decisions

1. Jurisdiction of subject proceeding
Where justice court was without jurisdiction in prosecution, indictment that
charged conspiracy with another to in-

duce prosecution witness to leave state
did not charge crime. Armstrong v. Van
De Vanter (1899) 21 Wash. 682, 59 P.
510.

9A,72«100. Bribe receiving by a witness
(1) A witness or a person who has reason to believe he is about to
be called as a witness in any official proceeding or that he may have
information relevant to a criminal investigation is guilty of bribe
receiving by a witness if he requests, accepts, or agrees to accept
any benefit pursuant to an agreement or understanding that:
(a) His testimony will thereby be influenced; or
(b) He will attempt to avoid legal process summoning him to
testify; or
(c) He will attempt to absent himself from an official proceeding
to which he has been legally summoned.
(2) Bribe receiving by a witness is a class B felony.
Enacted by Laws 1975. 1st Ex.Sess.. ch. 260. § 9A.72.100. Amended by
Laws 1982. 1st Ex.Sess., ch. 47. § 17.
Historical Note
Laws 1982, 1st Ex.Sess., ch. 47, § 17,
in subsec. (1), inserted "or that he may

have information relevant to a criminal
investigation".
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Severability—Law* 1982, 1st Ex.
Sess., ch. 47: See Historical Note following § 9.41.190.

RRS § 2324.
Former § 9.18.050.

Source:
Laws 1909. ch. 249. § 72.

Cross References
Bribery of witness, see § 9A.72.090.
Library References
Bribery s ^ K l ) .
CJ.S. Bribery § 1 et seq.
Notes of Decisions
1. Witness
of violating former statute; since by for, _
. . .
«
J
mer statute affidavit was made distinct
One who for consideration offered to m e a n s f o r bringing testimony of witnessmake affidavit to be used on motion for e s ^ f o r e court on motions for new trial,
new trial, stating that his former testi- a n d o r i e who testified by affidavit was
mony in case was fabrication, was "wit- witness. State v. Dooley (1914) 82
ness" within meaning of, and was guilty Wash. 483, 144 P. 654.

9A.72.110. Intimidating a witness
(1) A person is guilty of intimidating a witness if a person directs
a threat to a former witness because of the witness' testimony in
any official proceeding, or if, by use of a threat directed to a
current witness or a person he has reason to belk;ve is about to be
called as a witness in any official proceeding or to a person whom
he has reason to believe may have information relevant to a
criminal investigation, he attempts to:
(a) Influence the testimony of that person; or
(b) Induce that person to elude legal process summoning him to
testify; or
(c) Induce that person to absent himself from such proceedings.
(2) 'Threat" as used in this section means
(a) to communicate, directly or indirectly, the intent immediately
to use force against any person who is present at the time; or
(b) threats as defined in RCW 9A.04.110(25).
(3) Intimidating a witness is a class B felony.
Enacted by Laws 1975, 1st Ex.Sess., ch. 260, § 9A.72.110. Amended by
Laws 1982, 1st Ex.Sess., ch. 47, § 18; Laws 1985, ch. 327, § 2.
Historical Note
Laws 1982, 1st Ex.Sess., ch. 47, § 18,
in subsec. (1), inserted "or to a person

whom he has reason to believe may have
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information relevant to a criminal investigation".
Laws 1985, ch. 327, § 2, in subsec. (1),
inserted "a person directs a threat to a
former witness because of the witness'
testimony in any official proceeding, or
if; and inserted "current" preceding
"witness".
Severability—Laws 1982, 1st Ex.
Sess., ch. 47: See Historical Note following § 9.41.190.

Source:
Laws 1901, ch. 17, § 1.
Laws 1909, ch. 249, § 111.
RRS § 2363.
Former § 9.69.080.
Laws 1969. Ex.Sess., ch. 56, § 1.

Historical Note

l.aws 1982. 1st Ex.Sess.. ch. 47. § 19,
in subsec. (1). inserted "or a person
whom he has reason to believe may have
information relevant to a criminal investigation".
Severability—Laws 1982, 1st Ex.
Sess., ch. 47: See Historical Note following § 9.41.190.

Notes of Decisions

WESTLAW Electronic Research
See WESTLAW guide following the Preface of this volume.

approached was a witness or had reason
to believe that he was about to be called
as such State v. Stroh (1979) 91 Wash.
2d 580, 588 P.2d 1182.

Intent 3
Pending proceeding 4
Validity 1
Validity of prior law 2
Witness not under subpoena

Notes of Decisions
Pendency of proceeding
Validity of prior law 1
Words used 3
1. Validity of prior law
Section 9.69.080 (repealed; see, now,
this section), which proscribed tampering with a witness with an intent to
obstruct the course of justice was not
unconstitutionally vague. State v. Hegge
(1978) 89 Wash.2d 584. 574 P.2d 386.

cial proceeding" was not pending at the
time the threat was allegedly made, and
thus juvenile defendant could not be
convicted of intimidating a witness.
State v. Pella (1980) 25 Wash.App. 795.
612 P.2d 8.

t. Validity
This section defining offense of tampering with a witness is neither vague
nor overbroad. State v. Stroh (1979) 91
Wash.2d 580. 588 P.2d 1182.
2.

Validity of prior law

Words used
Whether a person attempted to prevent the appearance of a witness in violation of former § 9.69.080 (see. now.
this section) did not depend solely upon
the literal meaning of words used to the
witness, but could be determined on the
basis of the inferential meaning of such
words in the context in which they were
used. State v. Scherck (1973) 9 Wash.
App. 792, 514 P.2d 1393.

Section 9.69.080 (repealed; see, now,
this section), regarding tampering with a
witness, was not unconstitutionally overbroad on its face. State v. Hegge (1978)
89 Wash.2d 584, 574 P.2d 386.
Section 9.69.080 (repealed; see, now,
this section), which proscribed tampering with a witness with an intent to
obstruct the course of justice was not
unconstitutionally vague. State v. Hegge
(1978) 89 Wash.2d 584, 574 P.2d 386.

9A.72.120. Tampering with a witness
(1) A person is guilty of tampering with a witness if he attempts
to induce a witness or person he has reason to believe is about to be
called as a witness in any official proceeding or a person whom he
has reason to believe may have information relevant to a criminal
investigation to:
(a) Testify falsely or, without right or privilege to do so, to
withhold any testimony; or
(b) Absent himself from such proceedings.
(2) Tampering with a witness is a class C felony.
Enacted by Laws 1975, 1st Ex.Sess., ch. 260, § 9A.72.120. Amended by
Laws 1982, 1st Ex.Sess., ch. 47, § 19.

3. Intent
Fact that this section defining crime of
tampering with a witness did not expressly include as one of its elements an
intent to obstruct justice did not render
statute unconstitutional, as statute was
based upon apparent legislative finding
that attempts to influence a witness to
change his testimony or to absent himself from trial or other official proceeding necessarily have as their purpose,
and it is their natural tendency, to obstruct justice. State v. Stroh (1979) 91
Wash.2d 580, 588 P.2d 1182.
This section defining crime of tampering with a witness implicitly requires
showing that accused knew that person

2. Pendency of proceeding
Where threat against complaining party was allegedly made one day after arrest of codefendants and no information
had yet been filed at that time, and "offi-

Laws 1901. ch. 17. § 1.
Laws 1909, ch. 249. § 111.
RRS § 2363.
Former § 9.69.080.
Laws 1969, Ex.Sess.. ch. 56, § 1.

WESTLAW Electronic Research
See WESTLAW guide following the Preface of this volume.

Library References
Obstructing Justice <s=>4.
CJ.S. Obstructing Justice or Governmental Administration § 9 et seq.

Source:
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3.

In a prosecution for tampering with a
witness, intent to obstruct justice need
not be proved as a separate element, for
intent to perform acts proscribed by this
section, with knowledge or reason to believe that person is or probably is about
to be called as a witness, conclusively
shows an intent to obstruct. State v.
Stroh (1979) 91 Wash.2d 580, 588 P.2d
1182.
Prosecution must prove that false testimony was wilfully procured by accused,
who knew that it was false and that
witness would so testify. State v. Bixby
(1947) 27 Wash.2d 144, 177 P.2d 689.
4.

Pending proceeding
The existence of a pending judicial
proceeding was not an element of the
crime of witness tampering under former § 9.69.080 (see, now, this section),
which proscribed the interference with a
witness' appearance before a court or
officer in connection with any action,
proceeding, or investigation. State v.
Scherck (1973) 9 Wash.App. 792, 514
P.2d 1393.
Where indictment charging accused
with attempting to induce witness in
criminal case to leave state so that he
could not be produced in case contains
complaint in such case in full, which
fails to show cause was pending, indictment fails to charge accused with crime,
there being no crime to induce witness
to leave state except a cause be pending.
Armstrong v. Van De Vanter (1899) 21
Wash. 682, 59 P. 510.
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In order to convict the Defendant, Ralph Tolmanf of the crime of
Tampering With a Witness f as alleged in Count

IV of the Indictment,

you must find from the evidencef beyond a reasonable doubtf all of the
following elements of that crime:
1-

That the Defendant, Ralph Tolman, believed that an official

proceedinq r.r investigation was pending or about to be instituted;
2,

That* the Defendant knowingly or intentionally attempted to

induce or otnerwise cause C Dpan Larsen to withhold Ralph Tolman's
seven-page investigative report

-r August 1, 1983, regarding the May

1 , 1983 Fashion Place Profession..!; ^ .<:*•* a 'i'-e; a n d
3.

offense occurred on c

about and between August 1,

1983, and August 31, 1983, in Salt Lake County, State of

Utah.

If you believe that the evidence establishes each of the foregoing elements beyond a reasonable doubt, it is your duty to find the
Defendant, Ralph Tolman, guilty of Tamper nvi •* •- * Witness,

On the

other hand, if t fi-p evidence has failed to so establish one or more of
said elements, then it is your duty to fiau the Defendant not guilty.

A-8

INSTRUCTION NO.

12-

In order to convict the Defendant, Ralph Tolman, of the
crime of Tampering With a Witness, as alleged in Count IV of the
Indictment, you must find from the evidence proof beyond a
reasonable doubt that each of the following elements of the crime
were committed by him:
1.

That the Defendant, Ralph Tolman, believed that an

official proceeding or investigation was pending or
about to be instituted;
2.

That the Defendant knowingly or intentionally

attempted to induce or otherwise cause C. Dean Larsen
to engage in some conduct;
3.

That the conduct he attempted to induce or cause

was the withholding of Ralph Tolmanfs seven-page
investigative report from the official proceeding or
investigation; and
4.

That the offense occurred on or about and between

August 1, 1983, and August 31, 1983, in Salt Lake
County, State of Utah.
If you believe that the evidence establishes each of
the foregoing elements beyond a reasonable doubt, it is your duty
to find the Defendant, Ralph Tolman, guilty of Tampering With a
Witness.

On the other hand, if the evidence has failed to so

establish one or more of said elements, then it is your duty to
find the Defendant not guilty.
"A-9"

LARRY R. KELLER #1785
No. 8 East Broadway
Judge Building, Suite 426
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111
Telephone: (801) 532-7282
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RODNEY G. SNOW #30 28
200 American Savings Plaz.a77 West 200 South
\ -;;
Salt Lake City, Utah 8410.1'
Telephone: (801) 322-2516

,ty Clerk

Special Counsel and Prosecutors Pro Tempore —
Salt Lake County Special Grand Jury, 1986 Term
IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT IN AND FOR
SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH
STATE OF UTAH,

SUPPLEMENTAL ORDER

Plaintiff,

Case No, CR-86-1522
(Judge Raymond Uno)

CLAUDE DONALD HARMAN, AND
RALPH TOLMAN,
Defendants.

The matter of discovery came before the above-entitled Court
on January 30, 1987 with Larry R. Keller present and representing
Plaintiff, and Defendant Harman present and represented by Edward
K. Brass.
present.

Scott Reed, representing Defendant Tolman was also
After hearing arguments of counsel, the Court hereby

ORDERS, ADJUDGES AND DECREES:
1.

Counsel for Plaintiff shall provide to Defendant Harman's

and Defendant Tolmanfs attorneys, at Defendants1 expense, one
copy of all transcripts of the testimony of persons who appeared

"A-10"
1

oooi^s

before the Salt Lake County Grand Jury on the matter which gave
rise to the Indictment in the above-entitled case.
2„

No person receiving a copy of the transcript of testi-

mony before the Grand Jury shall allow any person other than a
member of the staff of the attorney or the Defendant himself to
view or read said transcript.

Further, it is ordered that no

other copies of the transcript of Grand Jury testimony shall be
created without specitic permission of the court.

It is further

ordered that any violation of the above orders shall subject the
violator to the full contempt powers of this Court.
DATED this

day of February, 1987.

'jLlh. w

RAYMOND S. UNO
Tni/rd D i s t r i c t C o u r t Ifrudge

0001G&

r^u3A£Dj
FILED IN CLERK'S OFFICE
Salt Lake County Utah

LONI F . DeLAND ( 0 8 6 2 )
SCOTT W. REED ( 4 1 2 4 )

McRAE & DeLAND
132 South 600 East
Salt Lake City, Utah 84102
Telephone: (801) 364-1333

MAR 7 1987

LWuty Cie»k

Attorneys for Defendant Tolman
IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT
IN AND FOR
SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH
STATE OF UTAH,
DEFENDANT TOLMAN'S LIST
OF WITNESSES

Plaintiff,
v.
CLAUDE DONALD HARMAN, and RALPH
TOLMAN,

Case No. CR 86-1522
Judge Raymond Uno

Defendants.
1.

Defendant anticipates calling no witnesses in

addition to those relied upon by Plaintiff.

However, Defendant

may call the following persons as part of his case in chief.
In addition to Plaintiff's witnesses, Defendant Tolman
may call:
Mike Christiensen - Salt Lake County Attorney;
Jim Burns - Salt Lake County Attorney's Office;
Brad Adamson - Salt Lake County Attorney's Office;
Shauna Clark - Salt Lake County Attorney's Office;
Records Librarian - Salt Lake County Personnel;
Records Librarian - Salt Lake County Attorney's Office;

"A-11"
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Records Librarian - P.O.S.T., State of Utah;
Don Sawaya - Salt Lake County Attorney's Office;
Ron Boyce - U.S. Magistrate;
Thomas B. Green - Kimball, Parr, Crockett & Waddoups;
Robert H. Henderson, Snow, Christensen & Martineau.
2.

The documents relied upon by Defendant may include

personnel records, reports, and training history of Defendant
Tolman.
DATED this

( **7 day of February, 1987.

v

EONI F. D eLAND ^ I
Attorney for Defendant Tolman

JfL

SCOTT W. REED '
~
Attorney for Defendant Tolman
CERTIFICATE OF DELIVERY
I HEREBY CERTIFY that on the

)j

day of February,

1987, a true and correct copy of the foregoing was hand-delivered
to Larry R. Keller, Judge Building, #426, 8 East 300 South, Salt
Lake City, Utah 84111; Rodney G. Snow, 77 West 200 South, Salt
Lake City, Utah 84101; and Edward K. Brass, 321 South 600 East,
Salt Lake City, Utah 84102.

o o o\&X
^
-2-

} Q | FILED IN CLERK'S OFFICE
iv f {
Salt Lake County, Utah

MAR 3 0 1987
j i.--^r, • H . Dixon Hindiey. C/ofK 3rc D;$r Co I T ;

LONI F. DeLAND (0862)
SCOTT W. REED (4124)
McRAE & DeLAND
132 South 600 East
Salt Lake City, Utah 81402
Telephone: (801) 364-1333

L L j ay

£=W

_

Attorneys for Defendant Tolman
IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT
IN AND FOR
SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH
STATE OF UTAH,
MOTION FOR ARREST OF
JUDGMENT

Plaintiff,
v.

Case No. CR-86-1522
CLAUDE DONALD HARMAN and
RALPH TOLMAN,

Judge Raymond Uno

Defendants.
The Defendant, Ralph Tolman, by and through his counsel, Loni F. DeLand and Scott W. Reed, herein moves this Court
pursuant to Utah Rules of Criminal Procedure Rule 23, §77-35-23
Utah Code Annotated (amended 1980), for an order granting arrest
of judgment due to impropriety in the jury deliberation which
resulted in a substantial adverse effect upon the rights of Ralph
Tolman.

This motion is made and the order should be granted for

good cause and in the interest of justice.
DATED this

^ °

day of March, 1!

LONI y. DeLAND
Attorney for Defendant Tolman

"A-12"
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QQ&«

SCOTT W. REED
Attorney for Defendant Tolman
CERTIFICATE OF MAILING
I HEREBY CERTIFY that on the

day of March, 1987,

a true and correct copy of the foregoing was mailed, with postage
prepaid fully thereon, to Edward K. Brass, 321 South 600 East,
Salt Lake City, Utah 84102; Larry R. Keller, Judge Building #426,
8 East 300 South, Salt Lake City, Utah 84111; and Rodney Gc Snow,
American Plaza, 77 West 200 South, Salt Lake City, Utah 84101.

ooa*fc4
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LONI F. DeLAND (0862)
SCOTT W. REED (4124)
McRAE & DeLAND
132 South 600 East
Salt Lake City, Utah 81402
Telephone: (801) 364-1333

,> i

FILED IN CLERK'S OFFlCt
Salt Lake County, Utah

aaas«9

MAR 3 0 1^87

H }

H. Dixon nmUKsy, o»ou< ^ ^ ~;3( v„-c;iji

By
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Attorneys for Defendant Tolman
IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT
IN AND FOR
SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH
STATE OF UTAH,
Plaintiff,

MOTION FOR MISTRIAL

v.

Case No. CR-86-1522

CLAUDE DONALD HARMAN and
RALPH TOLMAN,

Judge Raymond Uno

Defendants.
The Defendant, Ralph Tolman, having previously raised
the issues orally on the record through his counsel, herein makes
written motion for an order of the court vacating the judgment
and declaring a mistrial based upon instances of conduct by the
prosecution which substantially deprived Ralph Tolman of a full
and fair trial, as set forth in his memorandum which accompanies
this motion.
DATED this

3c?

day of March, 1987r

LONI F. DeLAND
Attorney for Defendant Tolman

"A-13"
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SCOTT W. REED
Attorney for Defendant Tolman
CERTIFICATE OF MAILING
I HEREBY CERTIFY that on the "3>0

day of March, 1987,

a true and correct copy of the foregoing was mailed, with postage
prepaid fully thereon, to Edward K. Brass, 321 South 600 East,
Salt Lake City, Utah 84102; Larry R. Keller, Judge Building #426,
8 East 300 South, Salt Lake City, Utah 84111; and Rodney G. Snow,
American Plaza, 77 West 200 South, Salt Lake City, Utah 84101.

ooo^ 9
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TILED IN CLERK'S OFFiC(:
Salt Lake County, Utah

AUG 1 9 1987

LONI F . DeLAND ( 0 8 6 2 )
SCOTT W. REED ( 4 1 2 4 )
McRAE & DeLAND
132 S o u t h 600 E a s t
S a l t Lake C i t y , Utah
84102
Telephone:
(801) 364-1333
Attorneys

for

Defendant

H. Dixon Hin^ey^C^^ 'fo u-.t Cc

3v —

^ — 4 — : "

Tolman

IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT
IN AND FOR
SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH
STATE OF UTAH,
Plaintiff,

AFFIDAVIT OF KARL
ANDERSON
Case No, CR86-1522

CLAUDE DONALD HARMAN and
RALPH TOLMAN,

Judge Raymond S. Uno

Defendants,
STATE OF UTAH

)
) ss.
COUNTY OF SALT LAKE )
I, Karl Anderson, being first duly sworn upon my oath,
depose and state:
1.

Affiant, Karl Anderson, was a juror in the

above-captioned case.
2.

After the second day of jury deliberation in this

matter, the jury was in agreement that Defendant Tolman's guilt
had not been established on any charge and the jury was 6-2 in
favor of acquittal as to Defendant Harman.

"A-14"

3.

Several jurors wished to break at or about 5:00

p.m. due mostly to church obligations (L.D.S.).

I expressed a

desire to remain since our verdict (of acquittal) seemed close at
hand.
4.

One juror, a professed L.D.S. seminary teacher, who

was the strong force for conviction, suggested we join in a group
prayer to obtain divine guidance in our deliberations.
5.

I was unhappy about the interjection of religion

but five other jurors seemed to follow the seminary teachers lead
on most matters and agreed to participate in the prayer.
6.

I essentially ignored the prayer but I did note

that immediately following the prayer the seminary teacher
expressed a certain knowledge gained from the exercise.
7.

I do not recall whether he claimed inspiration,

revelation or some other such guidance but he almost immediately
convinced the other five jurors of need to find the Defendants
guilty and from that point on, those six jurors became totally
immovable.
8.

It was obvious that from that moment on the jurors

who prayed would not be swayed in spite of their previous beliefs
that the evidence was insufficient.
9.

As stated in my prior affidavit, I eventually gave

in to convictions because the majority wouldn*t consider changing
and I was not aware we could be a hung jury.

There is no ques-

tion that the seminary teacher's call for prayer and subsequent

-2-

expressions of his knowledge of what was required of the jury was
the reason for guilty verdicts.
DATED this

/ y

day of August, 1987.

'^±^J&<J
£ARL ANDERSON
SUBSCRIBED AND SWORN to before me this

/ >-/ day of

August, 1987.

—NOTARY PUBLIC
Residing at Salt Lake City, Utah
My Commission Expires: [Q~ L- —C?D

FILED IN CLERK'S OFFICE
Salt Lake County Utah

LONI F. DeLAND (0862)
SCOTT W. REED (4124)
McRAE & DeLAND
132 South 600 East
Salt Lake City, Utah 84102
Telephone: (801) 364-1333

MAY 4 1987

Attorneys for Defendant Tolman
IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT
IN AND FOR
SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH
STATE OF UTAH,
Plaintiff,

AFFIDAVIT OF KARL E.
ANDERSON

v.
Case No. CR-86-1522
CLAUDE DONALD HARMAN and
RALPH TOLMAN,

Judge Raymond Uno

Defendants.
STATE OF UTAH

)
) ss.
COUNTY OF SALT LAKE )
I, KARL E. ANDERSON, being first duly sworn upon my
oath, depose and state:
1.

I am a resident of Salt Lake County, State of Utah,

residing at 3421 South 7860 West in Magna, Utah.
2.

Commencing on February 17, 1987 until March 6,

1987, I served as one of eight jurors in the case of State of
Utah v. Claude Donald Harman and Ralph Tolman.

3.

At no time during the trial or jury deliberations

did I form any opinion or belief that Ralph Tolman was guilty of
any of the charges.
4.

At no time was I instructed or led to believe that

I need not return a verdict or could withhold my verdict resulting in no decision by the jury.
5.

Had I known or been instructed that withholding my

vote and maintaining a position of not guilty was allowable and
would not result in prolonged deliberation, I would not have cast
a vote of guilty in this case.
6.

Since the time of trial and deliberation, my belief

in this matter has not changed.
DATED this

*/

day of May, 1987.

KARL E. ANDERSON
SUBSCRIBED AND SWORN to before me this

V

day of

May, 1987.

u
NOTARY PUBLIC
-WOT
Residing at Salt Lake City, Utah
My Commission Expires: [0 - ^ - *}Q
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CERTIFICATE OF DELIVERY
I HEREBY CERTIFY that on the

J-

day of May, 1987, a

true and correct copy of the foregoing was hand-delivered to
Edward K. Brass, 321 South 600 East, Salt Lake City, Utah 84102;
Larry R. Keller, Judge Building #426, 8 East 300 South, Salt Lake
City, Utah 84111; and Rodney G. Snow, American Plaza, 77 West 200
South, Salt Lake City, Utah 84101. **- ( ^ e
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LARRY R. KELLER (1785)
257 Towers, Suite 340
257 East 200 South, Box 10
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111
Telephone: (801) 532-7282

FILED IN CLERK'S OFFICE
Salt Lake County Utah

0CT_6 1987

RODNEY G. SNOW (3028)
200 American Savings Plaza
77 West 200 South
Salt- Lake City, Utah 84101
Telephone: (801) 322-2516

u
uvAJ
\teputy Clerk

Special Counsel and Prosecutors Pro Tempore —
Salt Lake County Special Grand Jury, 1986 Term

IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT IN AND FOR
SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH
STATE OF UTAH,
ORDER DENYING DEFENDANT
RALPH TOLMAN'S MOTION
FOR A NEW TRIAL

Plaintifff
VS.

Case No. CR-86-1522

CLAUDE DONALD HARMAN and
RALPH TOLMAN,

Judge Raymond Uno
Defendants.

Came on regularly for hearing on the 19th day of August, 1987,
Defendant's motion for a new trial and the Court having read the
memoranda filed by the parties and having considered the arguments of
counsel, and being fully advised in the premises, now therefor
IT IS HEREBY ORDERED:
1.

That Defendant's motion for a new trial is denied; and

"A-15"

2.

That the Affidavit of Karl E. Anderson be stricken from the

record.
DATED this 8th day of October, 1987.
BY THE COURT:

Raymond Uno
D i s t r i c t Judge

ATTEST
r\

CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE

H DiXON HiNDLEY
I
£-x
cicrk

8y

I

\ ^ Deputy Clerk

I hereby certify that I served true and correct copies of the
foregoing, by placing said copies in the United States mail, postage
prepaid, this 8th day of October, 1987, to the following:
Edward K. Brass, Esq.
321 South 600 East
Salt Lake City, Utah 84102

Loni F. DeLand, Esq.
Scott W. Reed, Esq.
McRae & DeLand
132 South 600 East
Salt Lake City, Utah 84102

